

Compensating for small delegation size in environmental negotiations: The role of external experts, experience, and coherence at the UNFCCC

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Abstract

In many multilateral environmental negotiations, Parties are formally equal. In practice, however, states are highly unequal in their capacity to participate in – and influence – multilateral negotiations. A frequently used indicator of negotiation capacity is delegation size. Delegation size clearly matters, with larger delegations better able to cope with highly complex, often very technical and lengthy negotiations such as those on climate change. Delegation size, however, varies enormously, with some countries only represented by two or three delegates. Countries with smaller delegations have, however, found ways to compensate for their limited capacities. Existing research has highlighted the role of coalition-building and cooperating with like-minded countries.

Yet, we argue that there are additional strategies to compensate for limited negotiation capacity beyond coalition-building that have not yet been studied systematically. We focus on three such compensation strategies: First, states can enlist the support of NGOs, think tanks or other experts to boost their numbers and access relevant scientific, legal or diplomatic expertise. Second, they can send more experienced delegates. Senior negotiators who attend negotiation sessions regularly are more familiar with the subject and process and are therefore better able to actively engage and make their voice heard. Third, and related to experience, states can also pay attention to delegation coherence by sending the same team over time. Coherence allows members of the delegation to specialize in different thematic sessions and follow them in parallel.

We test these three compensation mechanisms by examining delegation size and delegation composition in the negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We make use of new data generated from the list of participants to all Conferences of the Parties (COPs) as well as the interim negotiations of its subsidiary bodies from 1995 to 2019. We examine under what conditions smaller and poorer countries resort to non-state delegates to boost their numbers, send more experienced negotiators, and/or maintain delegation coherence as strategies to compensate for small delegations.

By focusing on parties' ability to participate in – and eventually influence – multilateral environmental negotiations, with this paper we seek to engage with the conference streams on architecture and agency and on democracy and power.

1. Introduction

In international negotiations between states, Parties are formally equal. In practice, states are highly unequal in their capacity to participate in – and influence – multilateral negotiations. A key indicator of this inequality is delegation size (Panke 2013; Borrevik 2019; Martinez *et al.* 2019). Larger delegations have multiple advantages: They have more legal, scientific, or diplomatic expertise, can attend multiple meetings and consultations (which often happen in parallel), participate in side events, network, and are generally better equipped to deal with the exhaustion of several weeks of negotiations that can extend into late hours or even through the night (Yamin and Depledge 2004; Roger 2013; Roberts and Parks 2014; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020).

Delegation size clearly matters but varies enormously in practice. To some extent, this reflects variation in salience or interest: not every country prioritises the same issues (Schroeder *et al.* 2012). More importantly, however, delegation size reflects different economic capacities: poorer countries simply cannot afford to send more delegates (Chasek and Rajamani 2003; Roberts and Parks 2014; Calliari *et al.* 2019; Martinez *et al.* 2019; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020).

Countries with smaller delegations have, however, found ways to compensate for their limited capacities. In particular, research has highlighted the role of coalition-building and cooperating with like-minded countries (Chasek and Rajamani 2003; Betzold 2010; Panke 2012; Klöck *et al.* 2021).

We argue that there are additional strategies beyond coalition-building to compensate for limited negotiation capacity: First, small states can enlist the support of NGOs, think tanks or other experts to boost their numbers and access relevant scientific, legal or diplomatic expertise (Carter 2020; Chan 2020; Carter 2021). Second, they can send more experienced delegates. Individuals can make a big difference, and a more senior and experienced negotiator who is familiar with the set-up, the negotiation process, the other negotiators, and the issues under negotiation is likely more engaged (Jones *et al.* 2010; Luomi 2011). Third, and related to the above, countries can also send the same negotiators, and maintain continuity in their delegation over time. Continuity allows members of the delegation to specialize in different thematic sessions and follow them in parallel.

Beyond delegation size, we therefore need to look at delegation composition (Chan 2020). In this paper, we examine delegation size and delegation composition, using the example of the climate change negotiations. We make use of new data generated from the list of participants to all Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 1995 to 2019, as well as the interim negotiations of its subsidiary bodies during the same period. We examine whether smaller and poorer countries resort to non-state delegates to boost their numbers, send more experienced negotiators, and/or maintain delegation coherence as strategies to compensate for small delegations.

In the following, we first review the negotiation and climate literatures on the importance of delegation size, the determinants of delegation size, and the role of delegation composition. We then describe our data and method, before turning to our results and concluding.

2. Literature review and expectations

2.1. Why delegation size matters

Multilateral negotiations are inherently complex (Crump and Zartman 2003), and increasingly so over time. The climate change negotiations are a prime example of this tendency. They have grown significantly in terms of size and scope over time. Climate summits now routinely attract thousands of participants who discuss in multiple parallel negotiating tracks and streams (Müller *et al.* 2021).

Given the sheer size of the negotiations, numbers matter. Having more delegates means being able to attend more meetings at the same time (Gemenne 2012; Roberts and Parks 2014; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020). The climate summits have formally a rule of no more than two meetings at the same time, excluding informal consultations (Yamin and Depledge 2004), and have made efforts to reduce the number of parallel meetings to six (UNFCCC 2010: §164) – which is already more than the number of delegates for many countries (UNfairplay 2011). In practice, the number of parallel meetings can be much higher. For example, for COP 20, Carter (2018: 84) counts “at least 17 meetings under five bodies (COP, CMP, SBI, SBSTA, and ADP) taking place [simultaneously]”. And this does not even consider the side events, pavilion discussions, or press conferences that take place ‘on the side’ of the negotiations, often at another end of the conference venue. These informal events – as many as 50 at any one time (Carter and Howard 2020) – are important sites for networking and interacting with non-state actors and the media, but attending these additional events requires additional delegates that smaller delegations do not have (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012; Calliari *et al.* 2019).

Negotiations also often run late into the night, or even through the night (Yamin and Depledge 2004). The final plenary sessions at climate summits often extend well beyond the original schedule. At COP17, the final meeting was 36 hours longer than scheduled (Tomlinson 2015). Such “negotiation by exhaustion” is particularly stressful for smaller delegations, who may simply be physically unable to attend all-night meetings, particularly at the end of an extremely busy two-week COP, whereas larger delegations can rotate (Yamin and Depledge 2004; Schroeder *et al.* 2012; Andrei *et al.* 2016; Chan 2020). Also, some delegates (from poorer countries) may have to leave early to catch their flights home (Yamin and Depledge 2004; Tomlinson 2015).

Negotiations are also very technical and require substantial expertise and preparation. While larger delegations typically have dedicated negotiators, or even dedicated teams, for each thematic issue, in smaller delegations, the same person has to cover multiple issues (Panke 2012; Andrei *et al.* 2016). This also means less time to read and process the many documents produced in advance of and during negotiations (Depledge and Chasek 2012). For the UN in general, Ó Súilleabháin (2014) describes a paradoxical “information asymmetry” for small states, as “they are inundated with information they cannot process while simultaneously lacking access to crucial insider information.” Smaller delegations also have less diplomatic experience, as Roberts and Parks (2014: 16) observe: “Developing country governments also have fewer negotiators skilled in the ways of Western diplomacy and brinkmanship.”

Overall, delegation size clearly matters. Roberts and Parks (2014: 16) even write: “The importance of the number of attendees that developed and developing governments send to negotiations can also not be overstated.” Larger delegations are at an advantage, while smaller delegations struggle to participate, engage and influence negotiations.

2.2. Why delegation size varies

Even if all states should have an interest in sending large delegations, as the previous section showed, delegation size varies significantly in practice (King 2016; McSweeney 2019; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020), ranging from only one or two to hundreds of delegates.

Delegation size does not only vary across countries, but also across meetings. The delegation size of a country can vary enormously from one meeting to the next. In general, more delegates attend the annual COPs compared to the interim sessions that take place every year in June in Bonn (Benjamin 2011). King (2016) counts 398 delegates for Guinea and 338 delegates for Côte d'Ivoire at COP21 in Paris, but only two delegates each at the subsequent interim session in Bonn. These changes partly reflect the different roles of the highly political Paris COP and the more technical interim sessions, and overall the cyclical nature of the negotiations (Neeff 2013).

Despite year-to-year variation, one can observe a general increase in delegation size over time: countries tend to send more delegates to recent COPs (Schroeder *et al.* 2012; Martinez *et al.* 2019; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020; Müller *et al.* 2021).

This increase in delegation size certainly reflects the growing importance of climate concerns. Yet, countries may prioritise climate change differently, leading to different delegation sizes (Schroeder *et al.* 2012). Kaya and Steuer Schofield (2020) find strong evidence for economic interests: carbon-intensive and oil-exporting countries send larger delegations. In contrast, their analysis finds only weak evidence that more vulnerable countries send larger delegations. Nevertheless, Martinez *et al.* (2019: 432) conclude from the increase in delegation size from Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years that “this shift entails that countries with higher climate vulnerability are sending more delegates to the COPs”.

More important than interests, however, seem differences in capacity: poorer countries do not have the financial and human resources to send more delegates to climate negotiations (Schroeder *et al.* 2012; Roberts and Parks 2014).¹ In their analysis, Martinez *et al.* (2019: 432) find a close relationship between income and delegation size throughout much of the history of climate negotiations. Similarly, Kaya and Steuer Schofield (2020: 484) find a strong, but non-linear, relationship between delegation size and income as well as population. While richer countries and larger countries tend to send more, this relationship is U-shaped: “Financial resources *beyond* a certain point do not increase NDS [national delegation size], and population *up to* a certain point does not boost [delegation size]” (emphasis in original).

Beyond interests and resources, the location of the COP matters as well: the more distant the location from a country, the fewer delegates that country sends on average. This is related to resources, as longer distances increase costs of travel (both in terms of money and time) (Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020). Finally, there is some evidence that democracy matters, too: more democratic countries also send larger delegations (Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020), possibly because they are more open to including non-state actors in their national delegation (Böhmelt *et al.* 2014).

¹ The UNFCCC recognises resource constraints, and therefore funds two delegates per country through its Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process {UNFCCC, 2017 #464}.

2.3. Why we need to look beyond delegation size

The last point on non-state delegates in delegation size already indicates the need to look beyond delegation size, and also consider delegation *composition*. Not all delegates are alike. We here highlight three differences between delegates.

First, some delegation participants are non-governmental, for example civil society members, or external experts and consultants that provide advice and support to the delegation (Chan 2020). Gemenne (2012: 419) calls these technical specialists “mercenary negotiators”, who may assist different countries at different meetings. Small islands in particular rely on external advisors (Corbett and Connell 2015; Carter 2018, 2020; Chan 2020).

Second, delegates fulfil different functions. Even among government delegates, not every delegation member is a negotiator:

“not all accredited participants may be involved in negotiations. Some officials are heads of governments or ministers who attend in a leader-representative role for a particular public initiative or the heads of government meetings. Other government or non-governmental officials may attend to participate in side meetings or the COP Expo; still more look after protocol duties for high level officials, or have media roles. Only a select few are known as technical negotiators” (Carter and Howard 2020: 310).

Such protocol or logistical staff do not directly contribute to the delegation’s negotiating capacity.

Third, individuals can make a big difference. The disproportionate influence of Saudi-Arabia in the climate change negotiations is not only linked to the country’s emissions, but also its skilful lead negotiator (Depledge 2008: 19; see also Luomi 2011). The role of individuals has also been underlined for smaller countries in particular, where individuals can “rais[e] the profile of a small country in negotiations by creating opportunities to make its voice heard” (see also Page 2003; Jones *et al.* 2010: 18). Accordingly, some countries make an effort “to involve particularly talented representatives in the negotiations, frequently from their UN delegations in New York” (Kjellén 2013: 53). “Sending the best delegations to diplomatic forums and appointing designated climate diplomats — for example, a special climate envoy or climate ambassador — reflects a government that has identified climate change as a national priority,” write Craft *et al.* (2021: 9), identifying this as one of the drivers of influence in international forums.

Many of these very skilled and competent negotiators also have a long history of attending climate meetings, thus building up experience, trust, reputation, and a deep understanding of the process. This continuity has contributed to the success of the Saudi delegation (Depledge 2008), and is of particular relevance to smaller delegations, who often suffer from high turnover or are unable to attend interim sessions (Carter 2018). They are thus not always aware of negotiation dynamics. According to a survey of island negotiators, two thirds “felt that their inability to attend all of the COP meetings affected their negotiating position ‘a lot’” (Benjamin 2011: 129; see also UNfairplay 2011). Accordingly, some countries like Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands “heavily invested resources to ensure that the same team of negotiators and supporting staff would always be present at each session” (Carter 2018: 157).

In sum, delegation size matters, but to fully understand negotiation capacity, we need to take into account also delegation composition. In particular, we argue that small delegation size can be compensated by including non-governmental delegates; by sending more senior and experienced negotiators; and by sending the same delegates over time.

3. Data and methods

To examine delegation size and composition, we rely on data from the UNFCCC lists of participants that are freely available from the UNFCCC website for both, the yearly COPs and interim sessions. We transferred the names and titles/affiliations from all governmental delegations for all meetings into an Excel database through an automated procedure.

This database covers a total of 54 meetings: 26 COPs (COP1 through COP25, plus COP6bis)² as well as 28 subsidiary body (SB) meetings. Note that SB meetings normally take place twice per year, once in June in Bonn, and once in parallel with the COP, which means that the list of participants to the two parallel meetings is the same. We have data for 195 Parties (including the observer states Vatican and Palestine) plus the European Union. Given our focus on the strategies of small countries, we only include 112 countries with populations of 11 million or less in the following analysis (for a list of countries included in the analysis, see the Annex).

In a first step, we manually cleaned the data and corrected the names of delegates. The participant lists sometimes have different versions of a name; for example, one of the authors of this paper, Paula Monica Castro Pareja, could appear as “Paula Castro”, Paula M. Castro”, “Paula Monica Castro Pareja”, etc. By considering affiliation and titles (i.e., on which country delegation the person was registered, and with which ministry/institution), we homogenised names. In the above example, we would manually “correct” all names to appear uniformly, e.g., as “Paula Castro”.

With clean names, we can in a second step compute the experience of individual delegates, as well as the continuity of delegations. We computed, for each delegate at each meeting, the number of meetings they had attended previously as a proxy of experience.³ To reach an aggregate **measure of experience** at the country level, while taking into account the fact that delegations invariably include individuals that only attend one or two meetings, we focus on the 25% of delegates with the most experience, and compute for each delegation and each meeting the average experience of those 25% most senior delegates.

As our **measure of continuity**, we compute for each delegation and meeting the share of delegates that attended the previous meeting.

Finally, using affiliations, we also automatically code each delegate into a number of functions, such as “government” for delegates that work for a ministry or state agency; “diplomacy” for delegates that are staff of embassies and permanent representations; “university” for researchers from a university or research centre; “NGO” for representatives of non-governmental organizations or civil society which are included in a country delegation; “external advisors” from consultancy firms and think tanks; and “private sector” for representatives of individual businesses or business associations (including also government-owned enterprises). Additionally, we make an effort to identify those delegates that do not

² COP6 was the only COP so far that could not agree on a final outcome, was suspended and re-convened as COP6bis.

³ Note that we hence only consider experience within the climate negotiations, but not other diplomatic experience, e.g., participation in other negotiations.

play a substantive role in the negotiations, such as security or logistics staff, translators, media representatives, spouses, or the like. This allows us to distinguish between government negotiators, external experts, and other, non-negotiating, delegates. Note that not every delegate has a title and affiliation; also, not every affiliation allows us to clearly assign delegates to a category. Those that we are not able to classify clearly are assigned to the “other” category. We use this classification to calculate our measure of external expertise: the share of the country delegation that is comprised of external experts.

This paper represents a first exploration of delegation size and composition for small countries with populations of 11 million or less. We therefore focus on mapping and visualisation, rather than more complex regression analysis (which is, however, planned as a next step, with all countries). We first describe variation in delegation size and composition, and then use scatterplots and non-linear trend lines to correlate delegation size with (i) the share of external experts; (ii) the level of experience; and (iii) delegation continuity. We additionally distinguish between Annex I (developed) countries; LDCs (Least Developed Countries) and SIDS (Small Island Developing States); and other non-Annex I (developing) countries to get a more fine-grained overview of delegation size and composition.

4. Results

Figure 1 simply plots delegation size for all meetings over time, for COPs (panel A) and SB meetings (panel B) separately. Note that we only take into account the number of government delegates to measure delegation size, excluding support staff (such as security or logistical support). Three trends become clear: First, delegation size varies enormously, ranging from just one person (or complete absence, not shown) to a maximum of 527 delegates for Denmark at COP15, when Denmark held the presidency (not included in the graph so that the scale is larger). Delegations at SBs are significantly smaller, comprising on average only four delegates, compared to 12 for COPs, and often again only one or two delegates. Second, delegation size overall increased over time. While the average delegation comprised four delegates (six for COPs, three for SBs) between 1995 and 2007, this number increased to 12 (18 for COPs, five for SBs) for meetings between 2008 and 2019. Third, there is a link between delegation size and income, proxied here by status (Annex I vs. non-Annex I), where Annex I delegations tend to be larger. This trend was most clear in the early period of negotiations, whereas since Copenhagen (COP9 in 2015), non-Annex I delegations, including from SIDS and LDCs have increased. The same trend is also visible in the number of one-person delegations, which were often from LDCs and SIDS for the period 1995 through 2008, but have become rarer since and are often from other developing countries (since 2008). We have added some noise to the figure (so-called jitter) so that the individual data points do not overlap and become clearly visible. Note that one-person delegations were particularly frequent at SB meetings, but have been increased to two-person delegations since 2008.




Figure 1: delegation size over time, for COPs (panel A) and SB meetings (panel B), by country group. Note the logarithmic scales in the y-axis, and their different range.

Let us now look beyond delegation size and turn to the three mechanisms that we argued small states can use to compensate for small delegation size: (i) enlisting external experts; (ii) sending more experienced delegates; and (iii) sending the same delegates.

4.1. Enlisting external experts

Figure 2 considers the share of non-state experts, such as NGO and think tank representatives or university staff, in relation to delegation size, separately for COPs and SB meetings. In these graphs the data points may overlap and thus represent more than one observation (no jitter).




Figure 2: share of external experts in delegations for COPs (panel A) and SBs (panel B) by delegation size (government delegates).

There are indeed many very small delegations that enlist the support of external experts, even (one-person) delegations that consist *only* of external experts, especially at SB meetings. But we also see that there are many very small delegations that do *not* include any external

experts, or only very few. There is thus no pronounced pattern; the share of external experts does not clearly change with delegation size.

We do, however, note that reliance on external experts is more prevalent among non-Annex I (developing) countries than among Annex I countries. For the latter, delegations include – on average – a maximum of 10% of external experts, regardless of the number of government delegates. LDCs and SIDS rely to the greatest extent on external experts, especially those with fairly small delegations of around ten delegates. In fact, for LDCs and SIDS, the relationship between delegation size and external experts follows an inverted U: while more government delegates at first also mean more external experts, the inverse is true for delegations of around ten government delegates or more. Here, more government delegates imply a lower share of external experts. This is as we expected: larger delegations (of at least ten government delegates) depend less on external experts. For other non-Annex I countries, this relationship is less clear; it rather seems that the larger the delegations, the more external experts are included. (The slight dip for SBs seems to be the result of some outliers rather than a clear trend.)

4.2. Sending more senior negotiators

Second, we compare delegation size (again only considering government delegates) and experience, focusing on the average experience of the 25% of most senior delegates, separately for COPs and SB meetings (Figure 3A and B, respectively).




Figure 3: average experience of the 25% most senior delegates for COPs (panel A) and SBs (panel B) by delegation size.

We note again that many very small delegations have very senior delegates, although variation is highest for the smallest delegations. This is unsurprising; for a one- or two-person delegation, if one delegate changes jobs or retires, the average experience declines dramatically, and may even be reset to zero (when a total newcomer to the climate arena replaces a (very) senior negotiator). Experience becomes thus more ‘stable’ and increases on average as delegation size increases to around ten delegates. Nevertheless, we note that the

delegations with the most senior delegates who have attended almost all meetings since the start are from extremely small delegations of only a handful of delegates.

As predicted, we observe a declining trend for delegations of around ten delegates. After that threshold, larger delegations are on average less experienced. This decline is particularly pronounced for non-Annex I countries (including LDCs and SIDS), especially at SB meetings. We do, however, observe a decline of experience as delegation size increases also for Annex I countries. Yet, the threshold is here higher, and the decline may be due to only a few relatively large and relatively inexperienced delegations.

4.3. Paying attention to delegation continuity

Finally, Figure 4 considers continuity, or the share of delegates that attended the previous meeting, again separately for COPs (panel A) and SB meetings (panel B). Here, it is particularly interesting to consider the COPs rather than the SB meetings. SB meetings are quite technical, and it is likely that all experts and negotiators that are part of the small SB delegations also attend the COP. In other words, we expect a high level of continuity between the SB meeting and the previous COP. This is what the data suggests, too: at SB meetings, more delegates have also attended the previous COP (panel B) compared to COP delegates who often have not been at the prior SB meeting in June (panel A).




Figure 4: share of delegates that attended previous meetings for COPs (panel A) and SBs (panel B) by delegation size.

For both, but more clearly so for COPs, we note a declining trend, as predicted: Smaller delegations have a higher level of continuity, i.e., the smaller the delegation, the higher the share of delegates that also have been at the previous meeting. Again, this relationship is least pronounced for Annex I countries, where the level of continuity does not clearly change with delegation size. In fact, the share of delegates that attended previous meetings varies quite strongly and does not decline significantly for larger delegations. For non-Annex I countries, in contrast, and notably for COPs, it is the smallest delegations that have – on average – the highest level of continuity. For SB meetings, we first observe an increase in the share of

delegates that have attended the previous COP as delegation size increases, which may again be due to the relative instability of very small delegations described earlier.

5. Discussion and conclusion

While this paper only represents a first rough exploration of delegation size and composition, the above analysis provides some interesting results. First, we note a clear difference between Annex I (industrialized) countries on the one hand, and non-Annex I (developing) countries on the other. The three compensation mechanisms that we postulated small states can use to compensate for small delegation size – including external experts, sending senior negotiators, and sending the same negotiators over time – are most relevant to LDCs and SIDS, and to a lesser extent to other non-Annex I countries.

While the data do indicate that all three mechanisms are used in the climate negotiations, they also show an extremely high level of variation and ‘noise’, which make it difficult to identify clear patterns. This is in particular true for the smallest delegations that comprise only one, two or three delegates. For extremely small delegations, variation from one meeting to the next is very high. This is of course unsurprising. Individuals make a large difference, especially for the smallest delegations. For a delegation of only two or three people, the loss of one (senior) negotiator is much more acutely felt than in a delegation of ten or twenty.

Our analysis also excludes zeroes, i.e., cases where countries had no delegation at a meeting. On average, at each SB meeting, 27 of the 112 small countries analysed here were completely absent. Even at COPs, 13 countries on average had no representative – although this number declined over time, and almost all countries attended the most recent COPs.

Finally, our analysis does not account for other factors that potentially have a large impact on both delegation size and composition. While we have examined Annex I and non-Annex I countries separately, we do not systematically control for wealth. That we do not find clear evidence for the compensation mechanisms among Annex I countries seems to suggest, however, that wealth influences not only delegation size (Martinez *et al.* 2019; Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020) but also delegation composition. We also do not control for meeting location, yet where a meeting takes place has large implications for costs (both monetary and travel time) (Kaya and Steuer Schofield 2020). It is much easier (and cheaper) for negotiators from small European countries to attend the yearly SB meetings in Bonn, Germany, than for their colleagues from the Pacific, for example. Further, special functions within the negotiations influence delegation size and composition. Countries that have the COP presidency, or that chair a negotiation group such as the G77 or AOSIS, are not only likely to send larger delegations. They also may enlist more external experts. Think tanks and support NGOs often provide support to negotiation groups such as AOSIS rather than individual countries, and hence get accreditation through the group chair. Finally, a more fine-grained coding of delegation composition may also be revealing. Müller *et al.* (2021) for example found that the presence of a minister is the most important determinant of delegation size: delegations that included a minister were on average larger.

Clearly, this paper represents only a first step towards better understanding small delegations; more systematic research into delegation size and composition is needed – and planned. This first step already indicates the value of going beyond delegation size, and consider delegation

composition, including the presence of non-governmental experts, negotiator experience, and delegation continuity.

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6. ANNEX

	avg. delegation size (COPs)	avg. delegation size (SBs)	number of COPs attended	number of SBs attended
Annex I countries				
Austria	29	11	26	28
Belarus	6	3	23	20
Bulgaria	7	2	26	27
Croatia	9	3	26	24
Cyprus	6	2	24	9
Czech Republic	16	6	26	27
Denmark	65	20	26	28
Estonia	8	3	26	26
Finland	41	17	26	28
Hungary	12	5	26	28
Iceland	8	4	26	28
Ireland	23	9	24	27
Latvia	9	4	26	26
Liechtenstein	3	2	24	12
Lithuania	9	3	26	21
Luxembourg	10	4	26	26
Malta	6	3	23	21
Monaco	7	2	25	21
New Zealand	20	12	26	28
Norway	44	20	26	28
Portugal	25	6	26	28

Slovakia	11	4	26	28
Slovenia	8	3	26	25
Sweden	45	21	26	28
Switzerland	21	11	26	28
LDCs and SIDS				
Antigua and Barbuda	4	2	26	26
Bahamas	4	2	25	10
Barbados	4	2	25	23
Belize	8	4	24	24
Bhutan	8	2	26	27
Cabo Verde	9	2	19	14
Central African Republic	10	2	26	28
Comoros	8	2	26	28
Cook Islands	7	3	25	23
Djibouti	8	2	26	18
Dominica	3	2	20	21
Dominican Republic	18	5	24	21
Eritrea	3	1	18	17
Fiji	16	10	24	15
Gambia	14	5	26	27
Grenada	7	3	23	24
Guinea-Bissau	7	2	26	25
Guyana	5	2	22	20
Haiti	6	2	25	15
Jamaica	6	2	26	28
Kiribati	9	2	25	22
Laos	7	3	25	24
Lesotho	11	2	26	28
Liberia	16	3	18	18
Maldives	10	5	26	23
Marshall Islands	10	3	24	22
Mauritania	17	2	26	26
Mauritius	4	1	26	28
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	10	3	25	25
Nauru	10	5	21	13
Niue	3	2	23	14
Palau	9	2	22	17
Papua New Guinea	22	6	24	25
Samoa	8	3	26	27
Sao Tome and Principe	5	2	21	21
Seychelles	12	3	25	22
Sierra Leone	10	2	25	25
Singapore	21	14	25	24

Solomon Islands	10	3	24	20
St. Kitts and Nevis	4	2	20	12
St. Lucia	6	3	26	25
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	4	2	15	11
Suriname	7	2	19	17
Togo	20	3	26	28
Tonga	9	2	18	17
Trinidad and Tobago	4	2	23	26
Tuvalu	11	3	25	22
Vanuatu	9	2	24	23
other non-Annex I countries				
Albania	4	1	26	23
Andorra	6	0	6	0
Armenia	5	2	26	25
Azerbaijan	6	2	23	22
Bahrain	9	1	18	9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7	3	20	16
Botswana	16	5	24	25
Brunei Darussalam	9	4	14	10
Congo Republic	34	2	24	23
Costa Rica	18	5	26	27
El Salvador	10	2	21	18
Equatorial Guinea	25	1	12	12
Eswatini	9	2	25	24
Gabon	14	4	21	19
Georgia	9	3	26	22
Honduras	15	3	26	26
Israel	19	2	25	16
Jordan	6	1	26	23
Kuwait	20	10	26	28
Kyrgyz Republic	7	2	20	12
Lebanon	9	2	21	19
Libya	7	4	25	20
Macedonia	6	1	17	11
Moldova	3	2	25	21
Mongolia	7	1	25	26
Montenegro*	9	2	11	11
Namibia	18	2	24	23
Nicaragua	5	2	26	23
Oman	10	2	25	17
Panama	17	4	25	28
Paraguay	17	3	23	24
Qatar	25	8	26	25

San Marino	4	2	6	2
Serbia*	11	3	14	11
Serbia and Montenegro*	7	3	3	4
Tajikistan	7	3	20	21
Timor-Leste	12	2	13	12
Turkmenistan	2	1	23	22
United Arab Emirates	36	8	26	26
Uruguay	8	3	26	28

* as of COP12 in 2006, Serbia and Montenegro were separate countries and sent separate delegations; their attendance is accordingly out of a maximum of 14 COPs and 14 SBs. Likewise, Serbia and Montenegro only could attend a maximum of 12 COPs and 14 SBs.