

Final Report 2017-2019

Environmental Change and Migration: The Role of Urbanization in Conflict Processes

2. Executive Summary

The "Executive Summary" concerns the content and results of the research. It should include the following information: -The research plan (problem statement, general objective, hypotheses, research methods, schedule, etc.);

The debate on whether and how climate change impairs human security and ultimately forces people to leave their homes and migrate to places more conducive to their wellbeing has experienced a strong revival in the climate change context. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2018), and academics and policy-makers argue that climate change is likely to cause mass population dislocations (migration) due to extreme weather events, such as stronger and more frequent storms, and floods, as well as longer-term, gradual problems, such as droughts, desertification and rising sea levels. And indeed, between 2008 and 2018, about 265 million people worldwide were displaced internally as a response to disasters (IDMC 2018). Furthermore, while it is challenging to project the scale of future migration flows as complex interactions between economic, political, or environmental factors shape people's movements, still experts agree that 143 millions of people, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, could be forced to move within their countries in the medium term due to climatic changes (Rigaud et al. 2018). Moreover, these people are expected to move from rural to urban areas, contributing to a long-term global trend of increasing urbanization especially in Asia and Africa (Rigaud et al. 2018; Henderson et al. 2014, 2017; Brückner 2012; Barrios et al. 2006).

While urbanization has been linked to reductions in poverty (Sekkat 2017), inequality (Castells-Quintana and Royuela 2015; Oyvat 2016), or to the formation of agglomeration economies and productivity gains, which, in turn, lead to greater national economic growth, particularly in less developed countries (Brühlhart and Sbergami 2009; Bertinelli and Strobl 2007), yet, rapid urbanization processes, when not managed well, can pose severe economic, social, or political challenges, including an inadequate provision of social services, such as health, education, housing and infrastructure, or energy systems. In addition, sudden urban growth can put more pressure on the labor market, thereby potentially fueling crime due to lack of economic prospects. These challenges might subsequently trigger ethnic hatreds, urban violence, and social unrest (Gaikwad and Nellis 2017; Buhaug et al 2014; Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Goldstone 2002; Brennan 1999; Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1995).

Given that climate change has the potential to contribute to this multifaceted relationship between urbanization and conflict, in this project we study the climate change-migration-urban conflict relationship. In particular, we examine a) how climate migrants are perceived among the wider public, especially in urban settings of developing countries, i.e., those places most intensively affected by climate migration; and b) whether and how rural-to-urban climate-induced migration contributes to migrants' conflict perceptions and intentions and, in turn, potentially provokes political instability in cities.

Theoretical arguments

In this part of the report, we summarize the theoretical arguments that link migration motives to potential for conflict in urban settings. Starting with how environmental migrants are perceived among urban residents in developing countries, we argue that individuals in receiving urban areas perceive some types of migrants more legitimate than others and, hence, should view environmental migration as a form of involuntary migration that deserves protection.¹ Thus, we expect city residents to welcome and allow individuals who flee from areas affected by climate-change-induced disasters to become residents in their cities. This higher acceptance should be motivated by humanitarian concerns and a higher willingness to help those in need. Furthermore, we expect urbanites to perceive some types of environmental migrants as even more legitimate than others. The extant literature emphasizes that sudden-onset extreme climate events, such as hurricanes and floods, induce forced (involuntary) migration due to their quick, extreme, and often unpredictable occurrence and the vast harm they cause (e.g., Koubi et al. 2016; McLeman 2014). Migrants experiencing such events could be seen as having no alternative than fleeing, thus being perceived as more in need and ultimately more welcome in cities than migrants who left their homes due to gradual extreme climate events, such as droughts. Due to their long-term nature, the latter usually allow affected individuals to adapt to changing climatic conditions (Koubi et al. 2016; McLeman 2014). This implies that people experiencing such events have a choice, to some extent, to decide whether and when to migrate. Gradual, long-term climate events therefore tend to result in migration that is likely perceived as voluntary, and mainly economically motivated (Cattaneo et al. 2019). In addition, urbanites' greater willingness to welcome environmental migrants fleeing sudden, short-term events may also be motivated by considerations that this type of environmental migrants is more likely to return to their area of origin than people who suffered long-term environmental deterioration.

Turning now to how the reason for migration (migration motive) affects migrants' conflict perceptions and intentions for conflict behavior in their new urban settings, we argue that individuals who relocated predominantly because of so-called pull factors, i.e., factors that attracted individuals to move from rural areas to cities such as better employment opportunities and standards of living, are more likely to integrate themselves in their new environment and show a lower intention for conflict behavior. In contrast, individuals who became migrants because of push factors, including climate change and a deteriorating environment, may be less likely to integrate successfully and are thus more likely to have conflict perceptions and intentions for conflict behavior (Koubi et al 2018). The main reason is that migrants, who were forced to leave their homes, are more likely to consider themselves as uprooted in comparison to migrants who moved voluntarily. Instead of trying to adapt in their new homes, forced relocation might cement a discourse and mindset of victimhood and injustice. We thus expect climate-induced rural-to-urban migration to not only increase the potential for conflict in urban areas by increasing the quantity of the issue, but also because the quality of migration differs. Furthermore, we argue that the specific type of climate shock, i.e., sudden versus gradual, that was the cause for migration likely matters as

¹ This argumentation draws on the international migration literature, which argues that people are more likely to perceive individuals who were forced to migrate, e.g., refugees fleeing conflict, as deserving sympathy and help (Bansak et al. 2016).

well. The main difference between these two types of climate extremes— gradual and long-term ones vs. sudden and short-term events – is that the latter hardly allow for adaptation, but mostly affect all individuals equally negatively, severely, and rapidly. Therefore, although, sudden, short-term events can often cause destruction on a large scale, their potential to incur relative deprivation is rather limited. The opposite tends to be the case for gradual, long-term climate events as the ability to adapt varies across individuals and thus can result in relative deprivation. To this end, migrants who experienced such gradual events in their previous homes should be more likely to have developed relative deprivation and grievances that lead to an increased conflict perception and support for violence. The rationale is that when people are constantly exposed to deprivation and grievances over a long period of time, they can become socialized to aggressive behavior and violence (Berkowitz 1993), and that such grievances continue to live in the minds of migrants (Koubi et al 2018). We thus expect migrants' conflict perceptions and intention for conflictive behavior to differ across the type of climate extremes experienced at migrants' home location, with gradual, long-term events likely to be linked to more extreme and intense perceptions and intentions for conflict behavior.


Research methods

In order to empirically investigate the proposed arguments, one needs data for both migrants and urbanites residing in less developed countries. Unfortunately, such data do not exist, and for this project, we collected our own data.

Country selection: We collected *micro-level* data for different types of migrants, including the two types of environmental migrants, and urban residents in two countries, namely Vietnam and Kenya. The selection of these countries was based on their level of (past, present and future) vulnerability to environmental/climatic changes and to high levels of urbanization. According to the latest Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index, which examines the extent to which states are affected by extreme weather events, Vietnam is among the top ten most affected countries, while Kenya ranks at number 45 (Eckstein et al. 2019). Furthermore, given our focus on rural-to-urban migration, we strove to include countries with high urbanization rates, which applies to both Kenya (4.1 percent) and Vietnam (3 percent). Both countries are classified as lower-middle income economies, with Vietnam's GNI per capita being \$2,400 current USD and Kenya's at \$1,620 current USD. In addition, environmental/climate issues are highly salient among the public in these two countries. For instance, according to a large, nationally representative survey by the UNDP (N>14,000 respondents) conducted in 2018 in Vietnam, 78% of the people surveyed reported that the global climate is changing. Similarly, according to the most recent Afrobarometer (round 7) survey conducted with 1,600 adult Kenyans in 2016, 65% of the participants had heard of climate change, and 50% of these respondents agreed that climate change was affecting their country and their own lives 'a lot'. Finally, in both countries, the surveys were conducted in two major cities (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam; Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya) as well as in one smaller city located in close vicinity to one of the two major urban centers (Thu Dau Mot in Vietnam; Kisumu in Kenya). The inclusion of the two smaller cities allows evaluating whether results depend on city size. The field work was conducted in July-October 2018 for Vietnam and in January-March 2019 for Kenya.

Overview of the survey:

Selection of survey sites and respondents: we employed a multi-stage convenience sampling strategy to recruit participants. The sampling procedure consisted of four steps. First, in each city, we randomly selected 3-4 districts (Vietnam)/constituencies (Kenya) in the two largest cities and a smaller one.² Second, within each district/constituency, ten enumeration sites were randomly selected (the map below shows the location of our survey sites and provides information about the population sizes of the selected cities). In each enumeration site, we identified a starting point from where enumerators would begin the selection of households. Starting points are typically located at a central location within the district such as the central market, a hospital, or the local community building. Finally, for the selection of households, from the starting point, interviewers adopted the right-hand rule, skipping every second house. Furthermore, we tried to enforce a gender and age quota to have broadly equal numbers of respondents from each group. The map below shows the location of our survey sites and provides information about the population sizes of the selected cities.



Definition of an urbanite respondent: A respondent is defined as *city resident* in our survey if (s)he met the following four criteria: (1) 16 to 65 years of age; (2) has permanent residence in the city of survey; (3) has lived in the survey site for 5 years or more; and (4) has never relocated to another location for more than 6 months within the last 5 years. Our sample consists of 400 respondents in each city for 1,200 respondents in each country (N = 2,400).

² Survey sites: *Hanoi*: Dong Anh District, Me Linh District, Nam Tu Liem District, Gia Lam District; *Binh Duong*: Thu Dau Mot City, Ben Cat Town, Di An Town, Thuan An Town; *HCMC*: Binh Chanh District-Tan Phu District, Thu Duc District, Go Vap District; *Nairobi*: Dagoretti North, Embakasi, Kasarani, Ruaraka; *Mombasa*: Jomvu, Kisauni, Likoni, Mvita; *Kisumu*: Kisumu Central, Kisumu East, Kisumu West.

Definition of a migrant respondent: A respondent is defined as a *migrant* if (s)he met the following five criteria: (1) 16 to 65 years old; (2) was born in a rural area; (3) came to live in the survey site when he/she was at least 16 years; (4) had stayed or intended to stay in the survey site for at least six months; and (5) had lived in a rural area for one year or more right before moving to the survey site. Furthermore, in order to classify different types of migrants (social, political, economic, and climate/environmental), we presented respondent with an extensive list of migration reasons and asked them to select the three most important motives that made them leave their home locations. Given that it is often difficult to separate the environmental from the economic reason of migration, we added a couple of addition criteria. Specifically, we classified a respondent as an *environmental migrant* if (s)he (1) had experienced environmental disaster(s), e.g., droughts and/or floods in the previous place of residence; and (2) had been personally (individual/household) affected by these events. disaster(s). Given that migrants are considered to be 'hidden population', we also used convenience sampling relying on a combination of referral and snowball sampling. Following this strategy, we collected data for 2,400 respondents from Vietnam and for 2,417 respondents from Kenya with equally sized groups of environmental and non-environmental migrants (i.e., 800 respondents per city; 400 environmental and 400 non-environmental migrants; N = 4,817).

Survey companies and training of enumerators: In Vietnam, we contracted the Mekong Development Research Institute (<http://mdri.org.vn/>) for the implementation of the fieldwork. In Kenya, we commissioned Digital Divide Data Kenya Limited (<https://www.digitaldividedata.com/>). The surveys were conducted face-to-face using tablets. As the work of enumerators contributes substantially to the quality of data collection, we took considerable care in the recruitment and training of the enumerators. First, the recruitment process comprised of 3 rounds: (1) Application screening, (2) written test assessment during the training course, and (3) evaluation of applicants' interview performance through their participation in the training course. Key selection criteria were interviewers' experience in conducting surveys with respondents from diverse backgrounds, their familiarity with the selected survey sites, and their knowledge of computer-assisted interviews in the field. The enumerator training took place in two cities in Vietnam (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City) and one city in Kenya (Nairobi). Over the course of several days, the enumerator candidates were guided through the questionnaires and practiced using tablets. Furthermore, they were required to conduct mock interview exercises in class and a real pilot interview in the field. The training course was designed in such a way to equip interviewers with both technical knowledge and soft skills needed for fieldwork implementation. In particular, the training provided an understanding of the idea and implication underlying each question, emphasized the interviewing skills, and prepared interviewers with essential skills to handle situations that may occur during fieldwork. The training primarily comprised lectures, discussion rounds, practice, and an actual field interview, delivered by experienced trainers of the contracted institutes and a member of the research team.

Model specification (and operationalization of variables)

Urbanites: To examine the determinants of urbanites' attitudes toward domestic migrants, we implemented a conjoint experiment. Choice-based conjoint analysis is a technique for handling situations in which a respondent has the choice between options that simultaneously vary across two or more attributes. While this methodology was introduced and mainly used in marketing research for analyzing consumer trade-offs and to forecast demand (Green et al.

2001), it has been recently introduced in social sciences, since it allows for a causal estimation of the so-called Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) (Hainmueller et al. 2014).

In our conjoint experiment, respondents were presented with hypothetical profiles of two potential migrants applying for permanent residence status in the respondent’s city. Each migrant profile comprises six attributes with varying levels. The levels of each attribute as well as the order of attributes were fully randomized. As shown in Table 1, migrant profiles provide respondents with information about applicants’ gender, age, level of education, their ability to make a living, ethnicity, and the reason why the applicant migrated.³ Each respondent compared five pairs of migrants. For each profile, respondents were asked to rate the migrant on a 1-7 scale with 1 indicating that the applicant should be sent back to their home location by all means and 7 signifying the applicant should definitely be granted permanent residence in the city. In a second question, we asked respondents to select between the two applicants and report whom they preferred receiving permanent residence.

Attribute	Attribute Levels
1) Reason for migrating	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Victim of storm/flood • Victim of drought • Religious/ethnic/political persecution • Seeking better economic opportunities • Family reunification
2) Ethnicity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kinh / <i>Kikuyu</i> • Muong / <i>Luhya</i> • Tày / <i>Kalenjin</i> • Khmer / <i>Luo</i> • Hmong / <i>Kamba</i>
3) Economic Situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to sustain himself/herself • Likely able to sustain himself/herself • Unlikely able to sustain himself/herself • Not able to sustain himself/herself
4) Education Level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not completed primary education • Primary school completed • Secondary school completed • Technical (post-secondary) school completed • Tertiary school completed • University degree or higher
5) Age	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18-25 years old • 34-48 years old • 52-65 years old • 70+ years old
6) Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Female • Male

³ We included these individual level characteristics i.e., gender, age, socio-economic status, and ethnicity because they generally affect public opinion on migration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) and also play an important role in environmental migration (Reuveny 2007) and urban conflict (Østby 2016).

Migrants: To assess individuals' migration motive on their perceptions of conflict (grievances) and intentions to behave accordingly in their new urban location, we rely on logistic regression models.

To operationalize the two main variables of interest, we asked the following questions in the surveys:

First, we asked respondents to what extent they (and their family) feel welcome by the local population in their new homes. Our survey includes a 7-point ordinal item, which captures how welcome respondents feel in their new location with higher values representing a more positive reception. We grouped values 1-3 (into value 1) and 4-7 (0) to generate a binary outcome variable, *Feeling unwelcome*, where 1 indicates that a respondent feels unwelcome and 0 otherwise. Second, we asked respondents to what extent they would be willing to join an organized group that aims at eliminating discrimination against migrants (*Join group*), to participate in peaceful protest rallies organized by the group (*Peaceful protest*), and to participate in protest rallies organized by the group, even if these may cause violent clashes (*Violent protest*). Responses were captured on a 1-5 scale per item, which we recoded again into binary measures with 1 indicating the respondent's willingness to engage in the activity at hand if an individual stated that it would be likely or very likely to pursue given activity (values 1 and 2 of original variable).

To control for confounding factors, we also collected information about migrants' socio-demographic characteristics, including respondents' age, gender, education, income, and whether the respondent migrated together with any other household member(s). *Education* is measured using the number of years a respondent has received educational training. To capture individuals' economic situation, we asked whether their income is currently enough to sustain a living. Response categories range from more than enough to far from enough. We generated a binary variable, *Low income*, and coded respondents who reported that their income was not really enough or far from enough as 1 (0 otherwise). All our models further incorporate fixed effects for cities and we estimated the core models separately by country or control for unobserved effect at the country level with a fixed effect.

Results

Urbanites' attitudes towards deserving migrants: Starting with the most legitimate motive, we find that while urbanites in Vietnam view family reunification as most legitimate, it is economic migration for Kenyan city residents. In contrast to much of the previous work on attitudes toward *international* migration, we do not find evidence for higher acceptance of forced migration. Specifically, in both countries, persecution is seen as the least legitimate reason for rural-to-urban migration. Regarding the legitimacy of environmental/climatic changes as a motive of migration, the results indicate that adverse climatic conditions are indeed seen as a legitimate reason to migrate. However, environmental migrants are not seen as more deserving than economic migrants. In both Vietnam and Kenya, there are no significant differences between climate-induced migration and migration due to the lack of economic opportunities. Similarly, city residents do not distinguish between migrants experiencing short-term extreme climate events, such as storms or floods, and individuals who were affected by long-term, gradual events, such as droughts. Overall, our findings run counter to some results in the existent literature, particularly on international migration, where individuals tend to be positively inclined toward those who are not to blame for their plight, e.g., refugees escaping war and armed conflict, and are thus more willing to support

and assist them. In our sample, residents are more willing to grant permanent residence to economic migrants and people moving to urban areas for family reasons (e.g., reunification in Vietnam) than those fleeing persecution. Regarding the remaining migrant attributes, in both countries, migrants who are least likely to pose a threat to resources as well as services provision in a city are most welcome. Interviewees have more positive attitudes toward young, well-educated migrants with sufficient monetary resources. In contrast, older migrants and those with low education levels or insufficient income are least likely to be accepted as permanent residents. Interestingly, our survey respondents do not seem to place much importance on the ethnicity of migrants.

Migration motives and conflict: Our results show that country-specific differences do exist. Some of the variables that are statistically significant for Vietnam are insignificant in the case of Kenya, and vice versa. Most importantly, the environmental variables are largely significant only in the Kenyan sample. Focusing on the pooled analysis, which combines respondents from the two countries, and controlling for state-specific effects with a fixed-effect setup at the country and city levels, we find that both events, *Sudden and Gradual*, are statistically significant; however, the pattern is consistent (and this mirrors the analyses for Kenya). In particular, migrants who had experienced a sudden environmental event in their previous location were more willing to join an interest group in their new city of residence or participate in peaceful protests. Migrants who experienced a gradual environmental event in their previous location, on the other hand, were more likely to feel unwelcome in the new (urban) location and willing to participate in protests even if these protests were to turn to be violent. Just to give a sense of the substantive effect of these changes, we calculate marginal effects at the mean when moving from 0 to 1 on either *Sudden event* or *Gradual event*. We find that the intention to join an interest group increases by about 5.7 percentage points when moving *Sudden event* from 0 to 1, while the chances of being willing to participate in peaceful protests rise by about 7 percentage points. On the other hand, a respondent who has experienced a gradual event before moving to a city has an almost 3-percentage points higher chance of feeling unwelcome than a migrant who was not suffering from a long-term climatic event; and there is an almost 2.5-percentage points higher risk of being willing to join violent protests.

-A summary indicating whether the results obtained correspond to those expected at the beginning of the research;

The results derived from our work while corroborate our theoretical expectations that climate-induced rural to urban migration can lead to both heightened conflict perceptions and an increased potential for urban political violence, yet this relationship depends on country context (Vietnam vs Kenya) as well as the type of climatic event migrants had experience in their previous location. Surprisingly, and contrary to the findings in the international-migration literature, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness and legitimacy of migration motives (environmental and political migration motives) do not rank particular high in urbanites' preferences relating to who should become a resident in their city.

- Information regarding the practical application of results;

In a world increasingly likely to be subject to severe climate change, the gaps in our knowledge about the consequences of climate change for migration and subsequently for conflict are daunting. In particular understanding the implications of climatic changes for urban migration and political violence is of tremendous policy importance. Both migration and urbanization on their own pose significant challenges to policymakers, and our project helps shedding light on the causes and consequences of these phenomena in the context of climate change. The formulation of appropriate policies by national authorities as well as the international community aiming at dealing with environmental migration requires knowledge of the relative contribution of climate/environmental migration for conflict. We believe that our research findings could have important policy implications for policymakers interested in knowing how to best cope with the effects of climate/environmental migration on urban conflict. The results of this research project can contribute to generating the scientific information on which policymakers can base their decisions (see also below).

- Questions that merit further exploration (scientific, practical, methodological) or that have risen as a result of the research;

While our empirical results provide some support for the climate change–migration–urban conflict nexus, further research is required. Given that, the obvious limitation of our empirical findings is that they are restricted to only two countries, namely Vietnam and Kenya, future research will have to focus on larger-scale primary data collection to compare several different countries. Furthermore, future research should examine which economic, political or institutional factors at both local, national, and international levels could mitigate the conflict potential of climate migration in urban settings.

- Practical and policy recommendations that follow from the results obtained;

In view of our results for the climate change–migration–urban conflict relationship, one policy implication of our findings is that a more differentiated perspective on the issue of environmental migration is urgently needed. In particular, it seems that urbanization processes need to be accompanied by strategies to integrate newcomers and assist them in managing their long-term grievances in order to avert future urban conflict. Another policy option might involve obviating the need for climate-induced migration in the first place by intervening at the earliest stage possible. This implies that sustainable development assistance is required to strengthen the coping capacity of communities affected by climatic changes.

- Information regarding past and expected publications and other activities (articles, books, conferences, workshops, etc.).

Publications: one paper has been accepted for publication and another one is in the revised and resubmit stage (both papers are attached to this report)

Spilker, G., Q. Nguyen, V. Koubi, & T. Böhmelt (2019) Attitudes of urban residents toward environmental migration in Kenya and Vietnam. *Nature Climate Change* (forthcoming).

Note that this paper had a different title as a working paper, i.e., Urbanites attitudes towards environmental migrants.

Koubi, V., Q. Nguyen, T. Böhmelt, and G. Spilker (2019) Climate change, migration, and urban conflict (R&R in the *Journal of Peace Research*).

Working paper: In this third paper, we will examine the relationship between climatic changes, migration, and urban violence at the macro-level. In collaboration with our geography partners at the University of Salzburg (Dirk Tiede, Stefan Lang and research assistants), we are collecting/retrieving data based on the georeferenced location of our survey migrant respondents' initial location (N=4800) as well as in the 6 urban centers in Vietnam and Kenya, pertaining to climatic conditions (temperature and precipitation from satellite data), changes in the land use (from remote sensing data), population (from national censuses), economic conditions (nightlight from satellite data), etc. for a long period of time before and after the migrants moved. Unfortunately, the collection of these data has been proven to be quite complex and time consuming (admittedly though we were aware of this!)

Conferences, Workshops, and Seminar Presentations:

1. The SNIS project was presented for initial reaction as well as feedback from the academic community at the Joint Uppsala-PRIO Workshop on Climate Change and Security, Uppsala University, Sweden, September 27 - 28, 2018.

2. Presentation of the (working) paper on "Urbanites attitudes towards environmental migrants," (Spilker, G., Q. Nguyen, V. Koubi, & T. Böhmelt) at
 - Annual Meeting of the European Political Science Association (EPSA), Belfast, Northern Ireland, June 20-22, 2019.
 - Annual Meeting of the Environmental Politics and Governance (EPG), Santa Barbara, CA, USA, June 27-28, 2019.
 - Annual Meeting of the Pacific International Politics Conference (PIPC), Taipei, Taiwan, July 5-6, 2019.
 - Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington, DC, USA, August 28 – September 1, 2019.
 - Annual Meeting of the Swiss Political Science Association (SPSA), Luzern, Switzerland, February 5-6, 2020.

3. Presentation of the paper on "Climate change, migration, and urban conflict "(Koubi, V., Q. Nguyen, T. Böhmelt, and G. Spilker) at
 - 4th Conference on Sustainable Development, Dhaka, Bangladesh, October 18-19, 2019.
 - Government Department's Speaker Series at the University of Essex, UK, January 21, 2020.
 - International Workshop on "Environmental/Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict," ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, February 31, 2020.
 - TAOYAKA Research Seminar, University of Hiroshima, Hiroshima, Japan, February 4, 2020.

This paper was also accepted for presentation at several other conferences (e.g., ISA in Hawaii, USA, March 24-28; EPSA in Prague, Czech Republic, June 18-20; EPG in Kleivstua, Norway, June 26-27). We were also invited to present it at university colloquia (e.g., International Studies Seminar Series (ISSS) at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Germany, May 4), and workshops (e.g., Climate-Conflict Workshop at PRIO, Oslo, Norway, May 19-20). Unfortunately, all these events were canceled due to coronavirus pandemic.

4. We also organized an international workshop on the theme of “Environmental/Climate Change, Migration and Conflict”, with the financial support of the Swiss Network of International Studies (SNIS), in Zurich on January 31st, 2020. The workshop focused on a) the state of knowledge regarding the relationship between environmental/climate change, migration, and conflict; and b) policy measures to cope with environmental migration in ways and by means that prevent conflicts in the future (see attached program). 10 invited speakers from research and academic institutions [Zorzeta Bakaki (University of Essex), Michael Brzoska (IFSH, University of Hamburg), Fabien Cottier (Columbia University), Andrew Linke (University of Utah), Kristina Petrova (Uppsala University), Etienne Piguet (University of Neuchâtel), Nina von Uexkull (Uppsala University and PRIO)], Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) [Leila Urekenova, United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)], and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) [Barbara Dietrich and Esther Marthaler, Helvetas], as well as approximately 20 guests attended the workshop (the program of the workshop is attached to this report).

5. We are planning to contribute an article to the UNEP’s Policy Brief Series.

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