

Rethinking Stakeholder Participation in International Governance  
Executive Summary  
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**1. The Research Plan**

**A. Problem statement:**

International institutions frequently set rules, standards or policies that affect stakeholders who have not had a say in their making. Think of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision whose standards, set by a small group of states, have been adopted in over a hundred jurisdictions. Historically, the interests of developing countries and civil society representing non-commercial interests have been most excluded or disregarded. Scholars and practitioners alike have criticized this participation deficit for undermining the democratic legitimacy of international institutions, and have been calling for greater participation of such marginalized stakeholders. Against this background, an interesting development has been underway: In the past two decades international institutions have introduced reforms to engage stakeholders.

**B. General objective:**

Against this background, this project's objective has been to examine: What stakeholder participation reforms have been introduced? Have these reforms improved the voice and influence of marginalized stakeholders? What effect have these reforms had on the legitimacy and effectiveness of international rule-making?

**C. Methods:**

The project zooms in on two policy fields: global financial governance and global health governance. It maps the organizational environment and distills a typology of governance institutions based on their key features. Within each policy field, the project all identified types of institutions. It then undertakes a number of comparative country case studies to grasp the consequences of reforms for previously marginalized stakeholders.

As regards stakeholders, the project focuses on 'marginalized' stakeholders', that is stakeholders who are interested in the work of the global institution or affected by it but lack a voice or participation rights. It distinguishes between marginalized governmental actors and non-state actors. Within the group of marginalized governmental actors, we distinguish between large emerging countries and small, low-income developing countries. Within the group of marginalized non-state actors, we distinguish between commercial versus public interest/social interest entities or groups.

As regards the typology of governance institutions, alongside the traditional treaty-based intergovernmental organizations, new forms of global governance are developing rapidly, most notably transgovernmental regulatory networks, multi-stakeholder partnerships and private standard-setting bodies. As such emerging forms of governance are rapidly becoming powerful global venues, their study is increasingly important. Accordingly, cases were selected – for each of the policy fields – to provide variation on each of these four types. For global health, the case studies are the WHO, Codex Alimentarius (intergovernmental organizations), International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), the International Medical Devices Regulators Forum (IMDRF) (transgovernmental regulatory networks), The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, GAVI Alliance (multi-stakeholder partnerships), and GlobalG.A.P (private standard setting body). For global finance, the main case studies are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (intergovernmental organizations), the Group of

Twenty (G20), the Basel Committee (BCBS/BIS), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (transgovernmental regulatory networks) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (private standard setting body). Multi-stakeholder partnerships are absent in global financial governance.

As regards the comparative case studies, in order to examine the effect the institutional reforms have had on the participation of marginalized stakeholders and to assess their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the rule-making or operational process, the project focuses on three pairs of developing countries: Brazil and Argentina, China and Vietnam, as well as India, Philippines/ Bangladesh. For each of these pairs, one country is a country from the Global South whose greater role in global governance is expected as a function of its large domestic market, sustained high levels of economic growth, and generally rising political and economic power (Brazil, India, China). Each of these countries is paired with a country from the same geographic region that is highly comparable on theoretically relevant variables, but which cannot rely on its fast-growing market size, and consequent political and economic power, to be included in global governance (Argentina, Philippines/Bangladesh, Vietnam).

#### ***D. Schedule***

We kicked the project off in February 2015 and are submitting the book to the publisher in June-August 2018.

## **2. The Results Obtained and their Analysis**

### **General Trends**

#### *Developing Countries*

International institutions in both global financial governance and global health governance have opened up towards developing countries – through membership (e.g. ICH, IMDRF, GlobalG.A.P., Global Fund, GAVI and MARTINO please add examples from finance), redistribution of voting rights (e.g. IMF and World Bank), strengthening of existing members' participation rights (e.g. Codex), or non-decisional participation rights (e.g. ICH, IMDRF MARTINO please add examples).

#### *Non-State Actors*

Global health governance has also extensively opened up to non-state actors. Treaty-based IOs have granted non-decisional participation rights (e.g. Codex and WHO), whereas new forms of informal governance have granted membership rights (e.g. Global Fund, GAVI, ICH, GlobalG.A.P.). In contrast to global health, global financial governance, with some modest exceptions, has not granted non-state actors membership rights. Notably, multi-stakeholder partnerships are absent from global finance. That said, non-state actors participate through non-decisional means, such as consultations (World Bank, IMF) or notice and comment. MARTINO, agreed? Please add examples.

### **Typology of Reforms**

We introduce the distinction between reforms, which give the right or opportunity to participate, and good participation reforms which seek to advance fairer and/or more balanced participation.

Further, we distinguish between formal participation and participation in practice. Irrespective of the *formal* rights granted, stakeholders may not be able or not interested in taking advantage of their participation rights, resulting in de facto dominance by developed countries or commercial stakeholders. Despite the right to participate, in practice, stakeholders do not or cannot always effectively take

advantage of their right, and this results in imbalances *in practice* (e.g. Codex, Global Fund). MARTINO please add

### **Participation: For what purpose?**

Our claim has been that stakeholders should be heard if they are affected by a policy or interested in it. Building on the case studies, it becomes clear, however, that stakeholder participation reforms have been driven by two different purposes: normative ideas or enlightened self-interest. These purposes may overlap or be distinct. The “normative” purpose is to hear stakeholders affected or interested, because that is the fair or right thing to do. This approach builds on theories of justice common in domestic administrative law, such as principles of natural justice. Quite often, however, stakeholder engagement is driven by enlightened self-interest, that is the dependency of the organization on the expertise or knowledge held by stakeholders.

### **Influence of Stakeholders**

Building on the country case studies, we have circumstantial, anecdotal evidence that the reforms have improved the participation of some stakeholders in specific cases.

### **Imbalanced Participation**

Despite the general openness trend towards developing countries, and despite some of the anecdotal evidence on improved participation and influence, participation is often far from balanced between developed and developing countries (e.g. Codex, ICH, IMDRF MARTINO please add examples from finance.)

Nor is participation equal and balanced between commercial and non-commercial interests (e.g. Codex, ICH, and GlobalG.A.P. GAVI, MARTINO please add examples from finance.).

### **Participation Factors: Institutional and Stakeholder Factors**

What factors determine participation, or how balanced or imbalanced it is? We find that two main factors determine whether and how stakeholders participate: Institutional factors and stakeholder factors. Institutional factors, notably, institutional participation rights, are a precondition to participation, but whether or how stakeholders take advantage of the rights, depends on stakeholder preferences and characteristics. Thus, participation of marginalized stakeholders through institutional reforms alone will not be achieved, as long as stakeholder factors are not addressed.

### **Institutional Factors**

Institutional design determines participation rights. Here we’ve identified several relevant matters creating imbalances:

*Differences in participation rights depends on organization type and/or it’s purpose*

- Health related standard-setting bodies (ICH, IMDRF, GlobalG.A.P.), and global financial bodies MARTINO please add examples from finance.) have improved the formal participation rights of large emerging countries (Brazil, China and India), but not, or to a lesser extent, of lower income or smaller developing countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines). This skewed pattern is a testament of the role of trade and financial concerns as the main drivers behind expansion. Being most concerned with spreading their international or harmonized standards to strategic countries, standard setting bodies have expanded towards them while excluding the rest.
- In contrast, the global health partnerships – Global Fund and GAVI – seeking to deliver health goods in developing countries, most often in low-income countries, are formally inclusive of

lower-income countries. However, being regionally represented rather than individually, developing countries have lost the one country one vote power they have in the IOs.

- Intergovernmental organizations are based on the principle of universality and with one country one vote are most inclusive (WHO, Codex). However, in finance MARTINO

#### *Executive Board Decision Making*

Notwithstanding membership rights granted to large emerging countries, in some cases, global institutions have maintained the founding states' advantage, such as by shifting executive bodies decision making from consensus to majority voting and veto rights (e.g. ICH and IMF). MARTINO do you want to expand?

#### *Imbalances in Non-State Actor Participation:*

In health related standard-setting bodies (ICH, IMDRF, Global.G.A.P.) and in global finance in general (Martino, examples please), commercial interests dominate. In some cases they receive more formal rights (as in the case of ICH or GAVI), and in other cases they dominate *de facto* (Codex) (Martino, examples please). The global health partnerships tend to be most inclusive of civil society.

#### **Stakeholder Factors**

The institutional right to participate is only a precondition to actual and effective participation. Whether and the extent to which stakeholders take advantage of their rights depends on stakeholder characteristics and preferences. We have identified several such factors: foreign policy, importance/saliency, resources, capacity, policy learning, expertise, national policy autonomy, and domestic legal regime.

#### **Differences between Large Emerging and Small Developing Countries**

Two main factors explain differences in participation between the large emerging economies and small low-income countries: First, the institutional factors addressed above. Depending on the organization's form/its mission, there are variations in participation rights. Second, stakeholder factors. In any given situation where both large and small countries have participation rights, there will still be variations in participation, and these are linked to the stakeholder factors. They explain the differences in participation between large emerging countries (Brazil, China, India) and lower income or smaller developing countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Vietnam and the Philippines). Thus, stakeholder factors continue playing an important role in whether and how marginalized stakeholders participate. Many of the stakeholder factors listed are associated with size and economic capabilities, such as resources, capacity and the increased saliency of international topics for large emerging economies. However, this breakdown demonstrates that the extent to which stakeholders take advantage of their participation rights depends on a whole host of factors. Notably, small countries, which typically do not participate due to an absence of resources, may do so if they have a particular expertise. Further, even with sufficient resources and capacity, some large countries might opt to skip the membership invitation so as to protect their national policy autonomy(as has been the case with India and the ICH).

#### **Risks of Non-State Actor Participation**

While international governance has democratized by opening up, the engagement of non-state actors introduces risks – of capture and conflict of interest -- which must be managed. So far, the WHO is the only organization which has adopted a comprehensive framework for managing the risks of non-state actor engagement, and it may serve as an inspiration for other organizations, though the jury is still out as to its effectiveness in curbing undue influence. This is an area where more work needs to be done.

#### **Differences between Global Finance and Global Health**

The biggest difference concerns non-state actors. Whereas in global health governance, non-state actors have joined as members in the new, informal governance models (trans-governmental regulatory networks, private standard setting bodies and public private partnerships), in global finance, non-state actors have not been entitled to such membership, and remain active behind the scenes. It is telling that multi-stakeholder partnerships are absent from global financial governance, albeit incredibly popular in global health governance. As regards developing countries, we found that global finance has opened up towards large emerging countries, continuously excluding small, low-income countries. In health, that has only been the case in standard setting organizations (both trans-governmental regulatory networks and private standard setting bodies), whereas public private partnerships have been more balanced and inclusive as are the intergovernmental organizations. The tendency of global finance and health related standard setters to open up to large emerging countries is driven by their desire to include those countries strategic for trade (harmonization) and finance, while maintaining their effectiveness. Partnerships, on the other hand, seek to provide solutions in developing countries, and inclusion of low-income countries serves this purpose. Finally, IOs are bound by the universality principle and this explains their inclusiveness (even when standard setting is concerned, as in Codex).

### **3. Do the results obtained correspond to those expected at the beginning of the research?**

In this section, we set out how the results correspond to our initial expectations on several topics.

**Typology of Reforms:** We knew that international institutions had been undertaking different reforms for stakeholder engagement, and we expected to see decisional and non-decisional participation reforms. We have indeed found that to be the case and we make the distinction above between membership rights, redistribution of voting rights and non-decisional participation rights. However, in the process we discovered additional kinds of reforms of relevance to participation. First, reforms whose purpose is to proactively assist marginalized stakeholders, such as by supporting existing members in overcoming financial or capacity barriers to participation (as in the case of Codex Trust Fund), or reforms which create incentives for including marginalized stakeholders (as in the case of the Global Fund which conditions funding on the inclusion of marginalized groups). Second, reforms whose purpose is to manage risks of engagement. In the course of the project we became more sensitised to the downsides of stakeholder engagement, notably capture and conflict of interest. Few organizations have introduced reforms for managing the risks of engagement (WHO FENSA). We grouped all of these reforms seeking to advance balanced and fair participation as “good participation” reforms. Finally, we also found that there was a need to distinguish between formal participation rights and participation in practice, as there remain significant gaps even when participation rights are in place.

**Differences between global financial governance and global health governance:** We expected to find differences between global financial governance and global health governance. Indeed, both fields have differences, but also share similarities. The biggest difference concerns non-state actors. Whereas in global health governance, non-state actors have joined as members in the new, informal governance models (trans-governmental regulatory networks, private standard setting bodies and public private partnerships), in global finance, non-state actors have not been entitled to such membership, and remain active behind the scenes. That said, they do enjoy non-decisional access in finance (as they do in global health). As regards developing countries, we found that global finance has opened up towards large emerging countries, continuously excluding small, low-income countries. In health, that has only been the case in standard-setting organizations (both trans-governmental regulatory networks and private standard setting bodies), whereas public private partnerships have been more balanced and inclusive as are the intergovernmental organizations. The tendency of global finance and health related standard-setters to

open up to large emerging countries is driven by their desire to include those countries strategic for trade (harmonization) and finance, while maintaining their effectiveness. Partnerships, on the other hand, seek to provide solutions in developing countries, and inclusion of low-income countries serves this purpose. Finally, IOs are bound by the universality principle and this explains their inclusiveness (even when standard-setting is concerned, as in Codex).

**Variations between organization types:** We expected to see variations depending on the type of organization (intergovernmental organization, trans-governmental regulatory networks, public-private partnerships and private standard setting bodies). What we found is that variations depend not only on the type of the organization but also on its purpose. Organizations whose main purpose is to set international standards, or to harmonize, have expanded towards large emerging countries, and continue to exclude small and low-income countries (or give them lesser participation rights, such as non-decisional rights or representation through regional organizations). Thus, we see this trend in trans-governmental regulatory networks and private standard setting bodies in both global health and global finance. The exception to this rule is when the standard-setting body is an intergovernmental organization. In that case, due to the principle of universality, also low income countries remain included (as in the case of Codex). Partnerships, whose main purpose is to advance health in developing countries, have been much more inclusive than the standard setting bodies. Inclusiveness serves their mission and purpose.

**What factors determine participation?** Building on the literature in international law, we expected that increased participation opportunities would indeed lead to improved participation and influence. However, we also theorized that the size of a country and its economy might have an effect on participation and influence. It is for that reason that we compared between large emerging countries and small low-income countries. What we found was that institutional participation rights are only a precondition to participation. That is, assuming a right or opportunity to participate has been granted, whether and how a stakeholder takes advantage of that right depends on stakeholder preferences and characteristics. We have gone beyond the country size and economy characteristic and laid out the main stakeholder factors which we now think affect participation: foreign policy, saliency, resources, capacity, expertise, policy learning, national policy autonomy and domestic legal regime. Some of these factors (such as resources and capacity) have a high association with large emerging economies, and indeed, these have been the main factors explaining variation between large and small countries. However, this breakdown demonstrates that the extent to which stakeholders take advantage of their participation rights depends on a whole host of factors. Notably, small countries, which typically do not participate due to an absence of resources, may do so if they have a particular expertise. Further, even with sufficient resources and capacity, some large countries might opt to skip the membership invitation so as to protect their national policy autonomy (as has been the case with India and the ICH).

**Non-State Actor Participation:** We expected the engagement of non-state actors to improve the democratic legitimacy of international governance. What we have found is that openness to non-state actors introduces a host of new legitimacy challenges, or “2<sup>nd</sup> generation” legitimacy challenges. One problem is that participation of non-state actors is often imbalanced, with more or stronger representation by commercial stakeholders over civil society. Such imbalance is occurring in various ways. First, through formal participation rules preferring the one over the other (such as in the case of ICH or Global.G.A.P.), or through the selective engagement of industry stakeholders. Other times, the rules do not distinguish between stakeholders based on their purpose, but in practice, more business stakeholders (often from the North) participate (as is the case in Codex). Another, related problem is that the inclusion of business stakeholders introduces risks of conflicts of interest and capture to business interests. As international institutions are regulating global public goods (finance, health), this is a significant issue.

This problem is most pronounced in standard-setting organizations (in both finance and health), as business has an important interest in influencing international standards or the harmonization of standards to fit its market access needs, and international institutions increasingly depend on industry for their technical and scientific expertise in the development of effective standards. This has also become an issue in international organizations, which receive donations from private foundations (WHO, GAVI). In 2016, the WHO introduced the Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors, yet it remains unclear how effective it is in managing risks of engagement.

#### **4. Practical Application of the Results**

International governance is fragmented, and different organizations follow different stakeholder engagement practices (if at all). For policy makers drafting stakeholder participation reforms, the results of this project provide a better understanding of the stakeholder participation reforms in place. Moreover, the spotlight on the problems of participation – imbalanced participation and risks of stakeholder engagement – increases awareness regarding the need to deal with these issues.

#### **5. Questions that merit further exploration**

Further investigating non-decisional participation: Under the “non-decisional” participation heading there are many kinds of processes: observer status, notice and comment, expertise. It would be interesting to dig a bit deeper into non-decisional participation. That is, to develop a typology of the different kinds of non-decisional participation rights, why they are put in place (what interests do they serve), and how they matter, if at all.

Influence on policy-making: This project has carried out qualitative case studies on stakeholder engagement. We have sought to learn, based on these case studies, whether marginalized stakeholders have been able to influence outcomes. Our results, hence, are ultimately anecdotal. Going forward, it would be interesting to do a quantitative study measuring participation and influence.

Managing Risks of Non State Actor Participation: With the rise in non-state actor participation come risks of capture and conflicts of interest, which potentially undermine the public interest, which international institutions are supposed to advance and protect. Future research would explore how significant and ubiquitous these risks are, and what can and should be done to mitigate them – through legal and public policy tools.

#### **6. Practical and policy recommendations**

1. Tailor stakeholder participation practices to their purpose: When international institutions adopt stakeholder participation practices, they need to be tailored fit for purpose. The purpose of stakeholder participation is roughly normative or enlightened self-interest (see above). For example, scientific experts could be selectively invited, but to be sure that the organization is open to all affected stakeholders, it should also have a public notice and comment.

2. To ensure balanced participation of marginalized stakeholders, it is not enough for international institutions to introduce stakeholder participation opportunities. They must proactively act to include them, through various measures, such as by mapping stakeholders, reaching out to them, supporting them in overcoming financial and capacity barriers, setting up accountability mechanisms (like the Global Fund) that condition service on balanced participation etc.

2. Introduce rules or measures for managing the risks of capture and conflict of interest in place.

## 7. Past and Expected Publications and other Activities

### A. Past Publications

Ayelet Berman, 'Taking Foreign Interests into Account: Rulemaking in the U.S. and EU' in 15 (1) *International Journal of Constitutional Law* (2017): 235-256

Ayelet Berman, "Industry, Capture and Transnational Standard Setting", 111 *American Journal of International Law Unbound* (2017)

Cheng, Cindy. (2018) "Codex Alimentarius Commission." *Reference Module in Food Science*. New York: Elsevier. (<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780081005965223767>)

DeMenno, Mercy B. 2017. "Rethinking Stakeholder Participation in Regulatory Governance: A Historical-Institutional Analysis and Proposed Theoretical Model." Presented at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting. Mexico City, Mexico. June 20-23, 2017

Martino Maggetti and Christian Ewert, "Comparative Regulatory Regimes and Public Policy" in an edited book by Sandra Van Thiel and Edoardo Ongaro "The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Public Management in Europe", Palgrave Macmillan (2017).

Martino Maggetti and Henrique Choer Moraes, "The Policy-Making of Investment Treaties in Brazil: Policy Learning in the Context of Late Adoption" in an edited book by Claire A. Dunlop, Claudio M. Radaelli and Philipp Trein on "Learning in Public Policy: Analysis, Modes and Outcomes", Palgrave Macmillan (2018).

### B. Forthcoming Publications

Ayelet Berman, "Stakeholder Engagement" in an edited book by Michael Barnett, Kal Raustiala and Jon Pevehouse on the "Future of Global Governance" (forthcoming)

### C. Future Publications:

We have secured a contract with Oxford University Press, which is the top publisher for law. The book is entitled "Rethinking Stakeholder Participation in Global Governance: Challenges and Reforms in Financial and Health Institutions". Aside for editing it, we have also contributed nine book chapters ourselves:

- (1) Introduction: Participation in International Governance: Reforms, Legitimacy and Effectiveness (all editors)
- (2) Rethinking Stakeholder Participation in Global Governance: A Theoretical Framework (all editors)
- (3) Voice and Influence in Global Governance (Reforms), Tim Büthe and Mercy DeMenno
- (4) Country Case Study Selection, Tim Büthe and Cindy Cheng
- (5) Institutions and Reforms in Stakeholder Engagement in Global Financial Governance, Martino Maggetti and Olga Kovarzina



- (6) The Effects of Stakeholder Reforms on Global Financial Governance, Martino Maggetti
- (7) Institutions and Reforms in Stakeholder Engagement in Global Health Governance, Ayelet Berman
- (8) The Effects of Stakeholder Reforms on Global Health Governance, Ayelet Berman and Joost Pauwelyn
- (9) Conclusion: The Integration of Marginalized Stakeholders in International Governance (all editors)

In addition, we will submit a paper on the project for one of the top peer reviewed journals in law or political science. Further, individual papers will be submitted by our team to journals for peer review.

**D. Workshops attended by core project members at which project related work was presented:**

**1. Ayelet Berman:**

*Invited participant*, “Trade, Public Policy and Health Workshop”, RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University, Canberra (5-6 June 2018) (forthcoming)

*Invited participant*, Brainstorming session co-organized by the OECD and the Global Governance Centre of the Graduate Institute, Geneva (April 2018)

*Invited presenter*, “Accordion Governance”, Global Networks and Power panel, International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco (April 2018)

*Invited presenter*, “Stakeholder Engagement”, The Future of Global Governance workshop, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (February 2018)

*Presenter*, “Accordion Governance”, ASIL Research Forum, St. Louis (26-28 October 2017)

*Presenter*, “Participation in International Governance 2.0”, International Society of Public Law (ICON), Annual Conference, Copenhagen (4-7 July 2017)

*Invited panelist*, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in International Law, American Society of International Law (ASIL), *Annual Conference* (April 2017)

*Invited presenter*, “The Evolution of Global Health Governance”, Future of Global Governance workshop, Social Trends Institute, Barcelona (December 2016).

*Invited presenter*, “Industry Associations and International Rule-Making”, Industry Associations and Transnational Governance conference, American Society of International Law (ASIL) International Organizations Interest Group (IOIG), Rutgers Law School, Newark/NJ (10 June 2016)

*Presenter*, “Stakeholder Participation in International Governance: 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Legitimacy Challenges”, *American Society of International Law (ASIL) Research Forum*, Washington D.C., (23-24 October 2015)

**2. Tim Büthe:**

- DeMenno, Mercy B. and Tim Büthe. “Voice, Influence, and Legitimacy in Global Governance (Reforms).” Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. San Francisco, CA. August 31- September 1, 2017.

- DeMenno, Mercy B. and Tim Büthe. 2018. “Voice and Influence in Global Governance Reforms.” Accepted for Presentation at the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance Biennial Conference. Lausanne, Switzerland. July 4 - 6, 2018. (To be presented jointly with Mercy DeMenno)

### 3. *Cindy Cheng:*

- “Unravelling Food Safety Crises in Authoritarian Regimes.” Midwest Political Science Association Conference, 2017.
- “Trust and Food Safety Regulation in China.” Rethinking Regulation Graduate Student Research Workshop, Kenan Institute for Ethics. 2016.

### 4. *Martino Maggetti:*

- *Presenter:* “Actors in European Regulatory Networks: An Exploration of Their Roles and Identities”. Conference Politique de l’indépendance, Centre européen de sociologie et science politique, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 12-13 January 2017.3
- *Presenter:* “The Emergence of Soft-Rule Making Capacity: The Case of the Institutionalization of the CESR”. TARN Workshop, Oslo, (1-2 February 2016).
- *Presenter:* “From Soft Law to Hard Law in Europe: Towards a Conceptual Framework”, EUSA conference, Boston (5-7 March 2015).

### 5. *Joost Pauwelyn*

- Speaker, “Governance Monday”: Global Governance, How To Improve The Governance Of Goods And Services? Global Approach, Regional Agreements Or Local Practices?, 16 March 2015, Swiss Press Club, Geneva
- Presentation on Expertise in International Economic Governance , Workshop on Production and Uses of Expertise, IHEID, Geneva, 21-22 May 2015
- Key-Note Lecture on The Stagnation of International Law, Global Governance Institute, UCL, London, 2 June 2015
- Discussant, Varieties of Global Governance Workshop, organized by G. Maillard & G. Balachandran, IHEID, Geneva, 13-14 May 2016
- Discussant, Workshop on Incentivizing the Grand Challenges: Mechanism Design for Addressing Major Global Problems, 10-11 November 2016, IHEID, Geneva
- Presentation & Discussant, Workshop on the Future of Global Governance, Social Trends Institute, Barcelona, 1-3 December 2016
- Conference on The Politics of Informal Governance, Discussant on Paper Presented by M. Onderco on Transformation of Informal Networks in Conference Diplomacy, IHEID, Geneva, 19-20 May 2017
- Key-Note Address on “Assessing the Trade and Environment Debate after 30 Years: Reflections from the Perspective of International Trade Negotiations & Dispute Settlement”, 2017 UEF-UNEP Course on MEAs, Chambéry, France, 9 October 2017
- Presenter on *IO Engagement With the Private Sector: Attracting Contribution, Not Capture: “Best Practices” in Selected IOs*, Barcelona Workshop on Global Governance, Access and Exclusion in Global Governance, 11-12 January 2018

- Discussant, The Future of Global Governance Workshop, IHEID / Social Trends Institute, IHEID, Geneva, February 10-11, 2018

### **E. Collaboration with International Organizations**

Ayelet Berman, Tim Büthe and Joost Pauwelyn are members of the [OECD Academic Friends of International Organizations Partnership](#). The OECD runs the IO partnership as a platform for collective action among IOs to “promote greater quality, effectiveness and impact of international rules”. Currently around 50 international organizations are members, and include the WTO, WHO, ISO, IOSCO and many more. One of the central themes of this network is stakeholder engagement in IO rule-making, and we serve as advisory members on this topic.

### **F. Presentations before international organizations:**

#### **1. Ayelet Berman**

Ayelet has made three presentations on our project and preliminary results at the following three OECD events:

- (1) Better International Rules for Inclusive Globalization, 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of International Organizations, organized by OECD, UNECE, ISO and IEC, Geneva (12 April 2018)
- (2) OECD Brainstorming Session – Relationship for Effective International Rule-Making, Paris (6 November 2017)
- (3) “The Practices of International Organizations to Engage Stakeholders—Contribution of Stakeholder Engagement to Good Regulatory Practices”, OECD, International Organizations: Their Role in International Regulatory Cooperation meeting (15 April 2016)

#### **2. Joost Pauwelyn**

Joost has made the following presentations within International Organisations:

- (4) Discussant, OECD Luncheon on International Regulatory Reform (Presentation by Céline Kauffmann), IHEID, Geneva, 14 November 2016
- (5) Table ronde sur l'accès et la participation des pays en développement à l'ORD: quels sont les défis?, WTO Headquarters, Geneva, 28 July 2017
- (6) Between prohibition and neglect: governance options for autonomous weapon systems, Geneva Disarmament Platform, UN, Geneva, Wednesday 20 September 2017, Presentation on Forms of Global Governance to Address Killer Robots
- (7) Brainstorming session on International Regulatory Co-operation, OECD, Paris, November 6, 2017
- (8) WTO 11th Ministerial Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 10-13 December, NGO Centre: Speaker on Panel Organized by CUTS on *Keeping Pace with Trade Developments: Needs of LDCs and Small Developing Countries*, December 11, 2017
- (9) Invited participant, Brainstorming session co-organized by the OECD and the Global Governance Centre of the Graduate Institute, Geneva (April 2018)