Ethnicity and Wartime State Violence against Civilians

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Abstract

How does ethnicity affect state violence in civil war? A large literature has examined the determinants of ethnic conflict, significantly advancing our understanding of when warring actors mobilize on the basis of ethnicity and pursue claims in the name of ethnic groups. Much of this literature draws implications from the ethnic mobilization of warring actors to the deliberate targeting of civilians, sometimes even conflating the two phenomena. Moreover, existing research offers very limited empirical insights on how ethnicity plays out in the manifestations of wartime violence against civilians. The lack of systematic data on the ethnic identity of civilian victims has left the question about the ethnic nature of such violence unaddressed. In this paper, we ask the question of whether the master cleavage of a conflict also predicts variation in state violence against civilians along ethnic lines. Disaggregating the concept of 'ethnic conflict,' we argue that ethnic exclusion is the main driver of state-led ethnic targeting in civil wars. We introduce a new global dataset on the ethnic identity of civilian victims of targeted violence to investigate these claims.

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1 Introduction

Armed conflicts between state forces and insurgent organizations often cause horrific harm to civilian populations, much of which results from campaigns of direct and deliberate violence against noncombatants. Such violence frequently follows ethnic lines, and governments and non-state actors target civilian members of particular ethnic groups. The conflict in South Sudan is just one recent example of an armed conflict where thousands of civilians have been killed in sustained campaigns of ethnic targeting (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2015, 495). In addition to the direct harm caused, this form of collective targeting is likely to polarize societies, complicate the prospects for reaching a peaceful settlement, and undermine the conditions for a durable peace. However, we still have a very limited understanding of when and why this form of violence occurs, and why some groups of civilians are repeatedly targeted while others are not.

While the role of ethnicity in the occurrence and intensity of political violence has been subject to an intense scholarly debate, this debate has remained conceptually vague. Efforts to explain such violence have often failed to make distinctions between the outbreak of ethnic civil war — pitting armed non-state actors against the government of a state — and the prevalence of wartime violence against civilians along ethnic lines. Whereas the two may be related, the issue of whether patterns of wartime violence revolve around the same macro-cleavages that define the core issues of civil wars is in no way settled in the literature (c.f. Kalyvas 2003; Mueller 2000).

In this paper we ask under what conditions we are more likely to see the state-led collective targeting of civilians along ethnic lines. Departing from the assumption that ethnic conflict necessarily breeds ethnic violence — or that the latter only occurs under conditions of ethnic war — we argue that ethnic exclusion, rather than ethnic claim making, increases the risk of wartime state violence against civilians along ethnic lines.

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To test these conjectures, we introduce new global data on the ethnic identity of civilian victims of targeted killings by state and non-state armed groups — *The Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset*. This dataset identifies the ethnic affiliation of all victims of direct and deliberate killings of civilians by both governments and non-state armed groups. It builds on the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007) and links the victims of such violence to the Ethnic Power Relations dataset on politically relevant ethnic groups (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015). In addition to the ethnic identity of the victims of one-sided violence, the data identify instances of one-sided violence that show evidence of ethnic targeting — cases in which victims were predominantly targeted due to their ethnicity by state and non-state armed groups.

The article is structured as follows. We first review the debate about the causes of ethnic violence more generally and violence against civilians along ethnic lines specifically. Focusing on the state as a perpetrator, we then outline our argument linking ethnic inequality to violence against civilian members of particular ethnic groups. The next section introduces our dataset, briefly describing the coding procedure and the data collected. We then present the empirical analysis before concluding with a discussion of the implications of our findings.

2   Previous Research

Much of the existing literature on ethnicity and political violence suggests that there is something particular about ethnic conflicts that makes them more prone to extreme violence than other conflicts. Horowitz (1985), for example, whose social-psychological theory about inter-group comparison and ethnic conflict has been influential in the literature, perceives of ethnic groups as extended kinship networks. He suggests that the analogy to family ties can explain why ethnic conflicts tend to escalate (Horowitz 1985, 61). Petersen (2002) argues that conflict among ethnic groups is likely to involve strong emotions such as resentment,

which in turn may explain why they may quickly intensify along ethnic lines (see also Bar-Tal 2013; Halperin 2015).

At the core of many theories is the idea of fear as a driving force of ethnic conflict. When groups fear for their own survival, they see violence as a preferred, if not necessary, option. Fear as a driving force does not exclude that violence is strategic. Posen (1993) first introduced the concept of the ethnic security dilemma, suggesting that mobilization along ethnic lines can make groups vulnerable and blur the distinction between defensive and offensive strategies. Group cohesion is seen as necessary for defensive purposes, but will be perceived as an offensive advantage by other ethnic groups (Posen 1993). This security dilemma will be aggravated when ethnic groups live intermingled and thus have a strong first-strike advantage (Melander 2009). As a consequence, violence against the civilian population will be intensified and ethnic cleansing strategies more likely (Kaufmann 1996). Empirical work suggests that warfare and violence against civilians in ethnic conflicts may be driven by both security dilemmas that reflect the overall macro cleavage and more micro-level mechanisms, including fear and personal grudges (Kalyvas 2006; Weidmann 2011).

Once ethnic groups are mobilized in a conflict, it may not matter so much how people identify themselves: the enemy may still identify the whole group as a threat (Kaufmann 1996; Fjelde and Hultman 2014). This means that ethnic conflicts often extend beyond the warring actors, implicating the civilian ethnic constituencies in the struggle. When elites exploit the fear among the population for such victimization, they are able to garner support for ethnic warfare in a population that would otherwise prefer peace (de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1999). According to Kaufman (2006), these dynamics are enabled by symbolic politics and group myths that exacerbate the fear of group extinction and justify hostility and extremist policies.

This literature shares the common starting point that ethnicity matters for understanding dynamics of violence. This assumption, however, has been questioned in the literature.

Kalyvas (2003) claims that warfare and violence against civilians do not necessarily revolve around the master cleavage, i.e. the overarching goals and discourses, at the centre. Instead, private motivations may interact with macro-strategies to drive political violence at the micro-level. Hence, even if the conflict is politicized around ethnic divisions, ethnicity as such does not necessarily drive the dynamics of warfare and patterns of violence (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). Similarly, Mueller (2000) denies that ethnic cleavages are more conflict prone than others and emphasizes the role of opportunistic individualist motives in ethnic conflict. According to this view, ethnicity is just a coordination device that political actors can exploit for their strategic goals.

The critique of the explanatory power of ethnicity, or ethnic divisions, highlights an important question — namely, whether violence against civilians along ethnic lines can be understood in terms of the macro-cleavage in ethnically framed conflicts. Kalyvas (2003, 2006) makes the case that we should decouple conflict and violence, and that dynamics of warfare and violence often follow distinct logics than implied by the master cleavage of the overall conflict. However, the literature overall often tends to conflate ethnic conflict and ethnic violence. Horowitz (1985, 3), for example, refers to violent ethnic conflict as a phenomenon that encompasses everything from secessionist warfare to civilian killings and ethnically motivated terrorism (see also Kaufman 2006; Fearon 2006).

The question of whether the same factors underpin the violent mobilization of ethno-political groups against the state and patterns of wartime violence is ultimately not only a theoretical but also an empirical one. The existing evidence testifying to the similarity between these two phenomena is based on weak pillars. While ethnic conflict is often assumed to encompass excessive levels of violence against civilians — and in particular, violence against members of specific ethnic groups —, empirical work often does not differentiate violence against civilians from conflict between armed actors. Hence, we do not know if ethnic conflict in fact does increase the risk of ethnically motivated violence against civilians

compared to conflicts where no such identity-based macro-cleavage exists, and which other factors drive violence against civilians along ethnic lines.

3   Ethnic Inequality, Conflict, and Violence

Based on an understanding of ethnic violence that clearly separates it from the notion of ethnic conflict, and focusing on the state as the perpetrator, we develop a theoretical argument of how ethnic inequality affects the likelihood of particular types of ethnic violence in armed conflict.

3.1   Ethnic Conflict or Ethnic Violence?

While it may at first glance appear trivial to ask about the relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, this is only so if the two are defined as part of the same phenomenon. Yet, ethnic conflict does not necessarily equate ethnic violence. For example, governments may identify and target members of particular ethnic groups, even if insurgent actors do not recruit exclusively from or make any claims on behalf of those groups. In such a case, we would observe a "non-ethnic" conflict, according to most definitions of ethnic conflict, but at the same time "ethnic" violence. In the armed conflict between the Peruvian government and the Maoist insurgent group Shining Path, for example, citizens speaking one of the countries native languages constituted 75% of the war's victims, despite representing a minority of the overall population (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003). This vulnerability of the native-speaking population to victimization occurred despite the fact that the conflict was clearly non-ethnic, i.e., despite the insurgents not making any ethnic claims, and despite the fact that neither the government nor the insurgents recruited its constituency exclusively from one or several particular ethnic groups (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003; Schubiger and Sulmont 2015).

The purpose of this paper is to disentangle the concepts of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of these conceptual distinctions. We define *ethnic conflict* in terms of the claims that the rebels make in relation to the state. Any conflict that involves a non-state armed group that claims to represent and fight on behalf a particular ethnic group, or that makes political claims in reference to a particular ethnic constituency, is considered an ethnic conflict. Since a government can be challenged by multiple rebel groups at the same time, it means that it can also be involved in both ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts simultaneously. As patterns of violence and mobilization are intimately related, with violence often fueling wartime recruitment (Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Schubiger 2013), we do not include recruitment patterns into our definition of ethnic conflict.[1] Moreover, by far not all insurgent organizations that draw support from ethnic groups endorse identity-based claims, as shown in table 1 (see below). Finally, recruitment patterns are complex and change over time, with many armed groups recruiting to some extent among several ethnic groups.

The most common type of conflict in the data we describe in the empirical section is one in which the rebels make claims on behalf of one or more ethnic groups and also heavily recruit from the same. These include for example the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the PKK in Turkey. In the second most common type of cases, none of these attributes are present – there is neither ethnic claim-making nor ethnic recruitment. This category includes, among others, the Renamo in Mozambique and the FARC in Colombia. More interestingly, however, are the cases where the two categories do not overlap, and where insurgent groups do not make any claims on behalf of a particular ethnic group, but recruit from an ethnic base to significant degrees. Examples of such groups are the UNITA in Angola and the CPI-Maoist in India. There are only few armed groups that make ethnic claims but do not appear to

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[1]This departs from other definitions of ethnic conflict, which require both recruitment and claim-making to simultaneously apply (Wucherpfennig 2011).

significantly recruit from a particular ethnic group, such as the Hezbollah in Israel.

When it comes to ethnic violence, we define it in two ways, focusing on the subset of *one-sided violence*, i.e., the deliberate killing of noncombatants by armed actors (Eck and Hultman 2007). We separate the question of whether violence is ethnic (*ethnic violence*) from the question of whether it was based on ethnic profiling (*ethnic targeting*): Violence is ethnic if civilian members of particular ethnic groups are deliberately targeted by armed actors. Targeting is ethnic if civilians are targeted *because of* their ethnic identity (see section 4.1). Ethnic targeting hence is a form or subset of ethnic violence as well as of collective targeting (Steele 2009; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014*b*) or 'group-selective violence' (Straus 2015, 20ff.).[2]

Below we lay out an argument that details whether, and why, ethnic inequality, recruitment, or claim-making on behalf of insurgent armed groups influence the likelihood of state-led civilian targeting along ethnic lines (*ethnic targeting*).

3.2   Ethnic Exclusion, Conflict, and Ethnic Violence

Existing research has pointed to the important role of collective grievances in fomenting ethno-political mobilization. Ethnic groups are more likely to engage in violent challenges against the state in a context where ethnic groups enjoy unequal access to political power, economic resources, social access or cultural status (Gurr 1993; Stewart 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Group-based cleavages and inequality give rise to grievances, thus providing a shared motivation for conflict that facilitates the capacity for collective action along group lines (Stewart 2008). A number of studies have corroborated the link from economic inequalities along group lines (Østby 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann 2011) and ethnic exclusion from national politics

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[2]On collective targeting based on ethnic and other identities, see also Steele (2009) and Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood (2014*b*).

(Cederman, Gleditsch and Weidmann 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013) to a higher risk of civil war.

We argue that ethnic exclusion — rather than ethnic claim-making — is also a main driver of wartime state violence against civilians along ethnic lines. In societies characterized by stark inequalities among ethnic groups, we are more likely to see civilian targeting along the same cleavages. In particular, it can be expected that ethnic inequality increases the risk of state-led civilian targeting along ethnic lines, while ethnic conflict does not.

Ethnic inequality represents an important dimension of exclusionary politics, as political marginalization is one form of "ordinary" state repression. We contend that targeted state violence against particular ethnic groups is an extension of institutionalized forms of non-violent repression in that it not only shares many of its roots — in particular exclusionary ideologies, incentives to block access to power and mass mobilization, as well as historically institutionalized forms of domination — but that it also determines which groups are most vulnerable to victimization. Ethnic inequality is often linked to and sustained by exclusionary elite ideologies, which are themselves an important determinant of mass violence against civilians (Straus 2015; Harff 2003; Mann 2005; Valentino 2014, 97) State militaries in countries with stark inequalities, too, are likely to be less guarded against deeply institutionalized racism (Goodwin 2001; Barak 2012; Wilkinson 2015). As Goodwin argues in his analysis of a selection of persistent revolutionary movements during the Cold War:

> "Particularistic mentalities such as racism obviously make it much easier for military officers and/or their charges to abuse people who are seen as 'naturally' or culturally inferior; in fact, military abuses of noncombatants in Guatemala and Peru in particular were clearly associated with the endemic racism of military officers, as well as political and economic elites, in those countries" (Goodwin, 2001, 248)

The role of ideology is complemented by strategic rationales connected to the armed conflict (e.g., Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Straus 2015). Exclusionary regimes are not only more prone to experience armed challenges (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013), they are also more likely to respond to any threat against their survival through the use of violence (Goodwin 2001; Valentino 2004; Ulfelder and Valentino 2008). Ulfelder and Valentino (2008), for example, find that armed conflict and state-led discrimination are two of the key determinants of state-led mass killings. In particular, they find that governments that already discriminate against communal groups in the form of formal exclusion or repression are more than four times as likely to engage in categorical mass killings as the ones that do not – suggesting that "governments which have demonstrated a willingness to use these kinds of *tactics* on their citizens during periods of stability are more likely to resort to even more extreme measures during times of crisis" (Ulfelder and Valentino 2008, 16).

We argue that such tactics are more likely to evolve into targeted violence against members of particular ethnic groups under conditions of high levels of ethnic exclusion. First of all, precisely because inequality often serves as a driver of insurgent recruitment in armed conflict, members of marginalized groups easily become suspected of collaboration with non-state armed groups. Marginalized groups also tend to be more isolated from privileged segments of the society[3] — and have often been historically so — both in terms of access to influential positions in politics and the military, and in terms of their geographic, linguistic and cultural separation. This multi-faceted segregation further increases their vulnerability to ethnic targeting, as it implies higher hurdles for state actors to identify insurgents and their collaborators from ordinary civilians, and lower barriers to collective targeting. Thus, while civilian ambiguity in all conflicts facilitates the legitimization of violence against civilians, and while groups with access to power might be perceived as the most threatening in some context, we argue that political exclusion will increase the risk of targeted ethnic

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[3]See also Schubiger (2013).

violence against marginalized ethnic groups.

In short, we hypothesize that ethnic exclusion will increase the probability of state-led ethnic targeting, and that marginalized ethnic groups are more likely to be targeted than those with access to political power. This goes against arguments that would imply that *included* ethnic groups are the main targets of state violence, as they have the greatest capacity to challenge the power and legitimacy of the regime (Roessler 2011).

Hypothesis 1 *Ethnic exclusion increases the probability of ethnic targeting by state actors during armed conflict.*

At the same time, and contrary to much of what the literature suggests, we argue that the extent of ethnic state violence should not be affected by the type of conflict. Ethnic claim making, the hallmark of ethnic conflict, should not increase the probability of state-led targeting against the alleged civilian constituency of armed groups. None of the mechanisms outlined above implies that the vulnerability of excluded ethnic groups hinges on being explicitly represented by an insurgent armed group. Moreover, ethnic inequality and exclusion, while breeding conflict and violence, do not always lead to ethnic claim making by insurgent groups. In Peru, for example, ethnicity has rarely served as the focal point of mobilization during the past decades — a pattern that was mirrored in the armed conflict (e.g., Schubiger and Sulmont 2015; Sulmont 2011, 25), yet that has not protected the most marginalized ethnic groups from disproportionate levels of victimization (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003).

Even when insurgent organizations do attract and mobilize followers from one or several particular ethnic groups, this does not necessarily imply that they pursue an ethnic agenda (cf. data description in section 4.3). Whether insurgents choose to engage in ethnic claim making has much to do with the specific context in which armed groups operate, and on the salience of ethnic versus other (such as class-based) cleavages — and is, after all, also

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an ideological question. For example, while some insurgent groups of Marxist orientation also claim to fight on behalf of a specific ethnic constituency, combining their ideological aims with an ethno-nationalistic and perhaps even a secessionist agenda, others do not engage in such practices. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN IM) in India is an example of an armed group that set out to represent the Naga population, the "natural citizens" (Suykens 2015, 139) of the independent polity it aims to establish. The Naxalite CPI (Maoist), by contrast, while also deeming to have special allies among certain segments of the population, started as a revolutionary project with a much more universal approach in terms of the claims it made and on whose behalf (Suykens 2015). We argue that the vulnerability of ethnic constituencies is first and foremost determined by ethnic exclusion. Thus, once we take the level of ethnic exclusion into account, whether an insurgent organizations engages in ethnic claim making or not should not affect the probability of ethnic violence or ethnic targeting.

Hypothesis 2 *Given high levels of ethnic exclusion, whether a conflict is ethnic or non-ethnic does not increase the probability of ethnic violence against civilians perpetrated by state actors.*

Our argument has specific implications for the relationship between recruitment, claim-making, and violence in armed conflict. First of all, the stated mechanisms imply that members of excluded ethnic groups are more likely to be targeted by state actors in armed conflict than members of non-excluded ones, and particularly so if they are being perceived as associated with insurgent armed groups.[4] As outlined above, even in non-ethnic conflicts, armed groups typically have ties to different ethnic groups, as they manage to attract at least partial popular support and followers from these groups. We argue that if non-state armed groups recruit their followers at least partially yet significantly from a constituency

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[4]See also Schubiger (2013).

that is excluded from state power, their civilian constituency is at a higher risk of being targeted by state forces – regardless of whether the government or other armed groups also recruit from the same ethnic constituencies or not.

As outlined above, members of marginalized ethnic groups are more vulnerable to victimization due to their limited roles in politics and the military, and due to often significant levels of segregation in society. Institutionalized racism and exclusionary ideologies further facilitate collective targeting by providing legitimizing frames and fostering violence. Thus, while civilian ambiguity in all conflicts facilitates the legitimization of violence against civilians, and while groups with access to power might be perceived as the most threatening in some contexts, we argue that insurgent recruitment from excluded ethnic groups will increase the risk of targeted ethnic violence against the civilian constituency of armed groups.[5]

Hypothesis 3 *State actors are more likely to target the civilian constituency of insurgent organizations if the latter recruit significantly from excluded ethnic groups.*

We can also formulate our hypothesis on the contrast between ethnic claim-making and ethnic mobilization to match more closely what we would expect at a disaggregated level. Specifically, none of our assumptions imply that ethnic conflict in the sense of ethnic claim-making is a major determinant of ethnic targeting. Indeed, we argue that if insurgent organizations recruit from excluded ethnic groups to significant degrees, whether they also engage in ethnic claim making should make little difference for the risk of state-led ethnic targeting against their alleged civilian allies.

Hypothesis 4 *Given that insurgent organizations recruit significantly from excluded ethnic groups, whether a conflict is ethnic or non-ethnic does not increase the probability that state actors will target the civilian constituency of these organizations.*

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[5]On recruitment from excluded ethnic groups as a determinant of collective state violence, see also Schubiger (2013).

4 Data and Research Design

Although previous studies have made claims about the ethnic nature of violence against civilians, they have been constrained by the lack of data on the characteristics of victims of violence and have relied on proxy measures to capture the role of ethnicity. Fjelde and Hultman (2014) for example, use the settlement patterns of ethnic groups and the ethnic groups' recorded linkage to armed actors to identify whether geo-referenced records of civilian victimization suggest a targeting of the ethnic constituencies of warring actors. Their conclusions are thus inferred from the location of violence and not the actual identity of the civilian victims. Subnational studies have linked violence to ethnic settlement patterns as well, exploiting case-specific data on the location of violence within conflicts. Sullivan (2012) examines an argument about targeting of rival ethnic groups using data on ethnic settlement patterns in Guatemala. Weidmann (2011) studies patterns of wartime violence and its links to ethnic demography in the war in Bosnia. One exception is Schneider, Bussmann and Ruhe (2012), who examine violence against civilians by ethnic group in Bosnia. Their study is based on data from the KOSVED dataset (Schneider and Bussmann 2013), which provides information on the ethnicity of victims of violence for 17 conflicts.

4.1 The Ethnic One Sided Violence Dataset

We introduce a new global dataset on the ethnic identity of civilian victims of one-sided violence. The Ethnic One-Sided Violence Dataset (EOSV) is the first dataset with global coverage that provides information on the ethnic identity of the victims of deliberate violence against noncombatants by armed state and non-state actors. Moreover, it provides information on instances of intentional ethnic targeting.

The dataset is built on the linkage of the *One Sided Violence* data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Eck and Hultman 2007) to the *Ethnic Power Relations* data, which

records all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive political power across the globe (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015). The one-sided violence dataset (OSV) records all instances where an organized armed actor, either a state or a non-state armed group, has been responsible for deliberately killing at least 25 civilians in one calendar year (Eck and Hultman 2007). For each actor-year, the *Ethnic One-sided Violence Dataset* (EOSV) provides information on which of the ethnic groups recorded in the EPR data were affected by one-sided violence (and by which actor), as well as whether members of these groups were subject to deliberate ethnic targeting. Uncertainty estimates accompany this information. The data collection relies on both the media reports that underlie the original coding of the UCDP OSV dataset, as well as other sources such as case-specific NGO and human rights reports. Below we briefly describe this data collection. For a more detailed description, we refer to the codebook.

Assessing the *ethnic identity* of civilian victims is not an easy task and there are many challenges involved in the data collection. As a general rule, we only assign ethnic group identifiers if the ethnic identity of civilian victims is explicitly mentioned in at least one of the sources that describe the event. This implies, for example, that the geographically concentrated occurrence of one-sided violence in areas primarily inhabited by a specific ethnic group is not sufficient to assign fatalities to this specific group. Instead, we corroborate the ethnic character of violence through independent sources that explicitly refer to the ethnic identity of civilian victims. As an exception to this rule, we infer the ethnic identity based on non-explicit (or implicit) information where the context in which one-sided violence occurs strongly implies — through indirect evidence on several dimensions — a particular ethnic identity, even though the latter is not explicitly specified in any of our sources. For transparency, we note for each case if the ethnic identity of victims was coded based on explicit and/or implicit information.

For all instances of violence against an identified ethnic group, we also code whether there

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is evidence of *ethnic targeting.* We try to assess the extent to which targeting was based on intentional ethnic profiling by making an assessment of whether one-sided violence was based on selective, individualized targeting, collective targeting (i.e. profiling based on potential victims alleged membership in particular groups), or targeting that was more or less arbitrary in the selection of victims (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014b). Individualized targeting based on behavioral criteria, campaigns of non-ethnic collective targeting, or instances of violence based on the arbitrary selection of victims do clearly not qualify as ethnic targeting. Of course, the context is not always clear, and targeting is sometimes based on behavior and identity, or a mix of different collective identities (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014b). To assess whether armed actors engage in *ethnic* targeting against particular groups, we look for evidence that civilian victims are being screened for ethnic 'markers,' or of explicit announcements of armed groups (or armed group leaders) to target members of specific ethnic groups — or other strong indicators of ethnic collective targeting. Rarely do the perpetrators provide statements indicating their intention to prosecute and attack particular ethnic groups, even in extreme cases of ethnic targeting. Hence, in the majority of our cases, the coding of violence as ethnic targeting is based on assessments by multiple other independent sources, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, local NGOs, Truth Commissions, or the United Nations, that armed actors did indeed engage in collective targeting based on ethnic markers. We also look for contextual evidence, such as whether members of ethnic group A were targeted under certain conditions yet members of ethnic group B were not. Geographic criteria or violence disproportionately affecting an ethnic group are not grounds for coding ethnic targeting. At the level of perpetrator-year-victim group, the ethnic targeting variable is based on a majority rule, implying that for each ethnic victim group and perpetrator-year, we code ethnic targeting ($= 1$) if there is evidence that at least half (50%) of the victims were killed in events with ethnic screening, and non-ethnic targeting otherwise. We always provide information on the level of uncertainty that goes

with this coding as well.

Importantly, we only code victims of one-sided violence that were recorded in the UCDP data. If there is uncertainty whether different sources point to the same events that are represented in the UCDP data, this is noted and recorded.

There are two particular challenges to this data collection effort. First, data on violence against civilians in civil war based on observed violence is most likely to be under-reported and to suffer from selection bias (Price and Ball 2015, e.g.). As a way of reducing this problem, we do not use any counts of fatalities, but instead code dichotomous variables of whether the parties relied on violence against members of particular ethnic groups, and whether such violence was based on intentional ethnic targeting. However, we are cognizant that there is still a risk that ethnic violence in cases of high state control over media or low international media attention go unreported and thus fail to appear in our dataset. Second, there are ethical considerations involved in identifying both victims and perpetrators along ethnic lines. For example, there is a risk of perpetuating ethnic cleavages by highlighting these dimensions. Absence of information about ethnic violence could also be used for political purposes by actors seeking to legitimize their own behavior. By not reporting numbers of casualties by group, we believe that we reduce this risk. Meanwhile, we have also been careful to rely on multiple independent sources in the coding of the different variables, and to document these sources and their potential biases as well.

Out of the 279 state-year observations we have with one-sided violence (according to the original OSV dataset) we have identified at least one ethnic victim group in 69 percent of the cases. In 29 percent of the cases we have identified two or more victim groups. In Burma, we identify as many as seven separate ethnic victim groups. The fact that we identify ethnic victim groups does not mean that civilians are targeted because of their ethnic identity. Looking at the second variable we code, ethnic targeting, we find that it occurs in 49 percent of the cases, and carried out by 29 different state actors.

Among the government actors that are recorded as having engaged in ethnic targeting, the following five note the highest fatality counts: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sudan. While ethnic targeting on average leads to higher fatality counts, there are a few examples of governments killing a large number of civilians without any observed ethnic targeting, such as Syria and the Central African Republic. Note, however, that our coding criteria are strict, and we only code ethnic targeting when multiple sources point towards ethnic profiling in at least 50% of the reported victims.

While we do not report the actual number of civilian fatalities due to ethnic targeting, we note that the average number of fatalities is much higher in those cases when the state is coded as engaging in ethnic targeting. The average number of fatalities in one-sided violence by states is 173, whereas the same for state-years for which we have recorded ethnic targeting is 4148 (475 if we exclude the Rwandan genocide). These numbers indicate that states that identify civilian victims along ethnic lines, at least to some extent, kill much more people. These numbers testify to the importance of understanding the drivers of ethnic targeting, since it leads to such extreme levels of victimization.

4.2   Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variables

For the purpose of evaluating the hypotheses in this paper, we construct two datasets, both with global scope and covering the years 1989-2013. The first is used to evaluate the hypotheses relating to the country level (H1 and H2). It contains annual observations from all countries experiencing an ongoing armed conflict according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's definition, using a 25 battle death criteria (Gleditsch 2002).[6] The country level dataset is suitable for evaluating the relationship between ethnic inequality in society and the conflict behavior of governments more generally. The second dataset is used to evaluate the hypotheses relating to rebel-specific characteristics (H3 and H4) and contains

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[6]See www.ucdp.uu.se for definitions.

annual observations of all conflict dyads — i.e. all pairs of government-rebel actors — involved in an armed conflict as defined by the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and meeting the 25 battle death threshold (Harbom and Melander 2008). With the dyadic set-up, we are better able to account for specific actor characteristics and the use of violence against particular constituencies in a detailed manner, even in conflicts that see multiple rebel actors.

Our dependent variable is *ethnic targeting*. In the country-level analyses this denotes whether we are able to identify intentional ethnic targeting against any ethnic victim groups among the civilians killed by the government in a given conflict year. Intentional ethnic targeting reflects a deliberate strategy of screening based on civilians' alleged ethnic identity. This variable takes the value of one when we can identify at least one ethnic victim group among the civilian fatalities, and the majority of the victims of that group is targeted based on their collective ethnic identity and not because of their individual behavior, another collective identity, or based on some more indiscriminate criteria such as geography. In the dyad-level analysis this variable denotes whether we observe intentional ethnic targeting directed against the rebel group's alleged ethnic constituency. This variable thus takes the value of one if there is evidence that the ethnic violence was a result of a deliberate campaign of collective targeting of the particular ethnic group. Here we rely on the ACD2EPR dataset to establish a link between the rebel actor and the ethnic group via recruitment (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

While proceeding in this way to construct our data to evaluate our hypotheses is convenient, it comes with a caveat. All our analyses, by focusing on in-conflict observations, will assess the effect of our variables conditional on a war having started. As both observables and unobservables are likely to affect the likelihood of war and the occurrence of ethnic violence, the results we present below need to be taken with a grain of salt. We will briefly mention in the conclusion what salt-grinder might help reducing somewhat the size of this grain in future analyses.

4.3 Ethnic Exclusion, Claim Making, and Recruitment

Our main independent variable is *ethnic exclusion*. We focus on ethnic inequality in the political sphere and whether ethnic groups' enjoy equal access to or are excluded from political power. We use two alternative operationalizations of this variable. For the country-level analysis we examine the effect of ethnic inequality at the country level by constructing a variable corresponding to the size of the population belonging to ethnic groups that are excluded from political power as a fraction of the total population. The variable is taken from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015), which focuses on politically relevant ethnic groups, defined as groups where at least one political organization exist to represent the group in the national political arena and/or the group is subject to overt discrimination. The EPR dataset records ethnic groups' inclusion and exclusion from the executive political branch. This could for example include control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration. Political exclusion may range from self-exclusion to overt discrimination from the government against ethnic groups. For our dyad level analysis we rely on a more direct operationalization of exclusion at the group level. The variable *Excluded rebel constituency* denotes whether the rebel group has direct organizational links to at least one ethnic group that are excluded from political power, according to the EPR definition above. We focus on patterns of mobilization to identify from which ethnic group the rebel group recruits (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). The variable is coded one if the rebel group recruits from an ethnic group excluded from state power, and zero for all other cases.[7]

We are also specifically interested in the influence of ethnic conflict on the occurrence of ethnic violence. The variable *Ethnic conflict* identifies those instances where the rebel group makes a claim on behalf of an ethnic group. More specifically, we code an ethnic

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[7]Note that the ACD2EPR dataset separates whether recruitment from the ethnic group is exclusively done by the rebel side, or if both the rebel side and the government recruits from this constituency. We do not make this separation, and focus on any recruitment, whether it is exclusive or not.

Table 1: Ethnic Claim Making and Recruitment in Armed Groups

Claim		No	Yes	
Recruitment	No	45 (80)	2 (5)	47 (85)
	Yes	66 (75)	164 (164)	230 (239)
		111 (155)	166 (169)	

The number of unique actors in each cell (numbers in parentheses when we treat missing values as 0).

conflict if a given rebel organization publicly announces that it is operating on behalf of a politically relevant ethnic group and pursues an agenda directly linked to the group's fate. The ACD2EPR dataset describes the relationship between rebel actors and politically relevant ethnic groups by linking the armed conflict dataset from UCDP (Gleditsch 2002) to EPR groups (Vogt et al. 2015), and codes whether rebel groups pursue an ethnic agenda or not (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

Central to the coding of both independent and dependent variables is the ACD2EPR dataset linking rebel actors to politically relevant ethnic groups, distinguishing between exclusive *claim making* on behalf of the ethnic group and patterns of *recruitment* from the ethnic group. The former underlies our coding of whether the conflict is ethnic or not, the latter whether civilian targeting is directed against rebel's constituencies. Importantly, significant variation exists in the ACD2EPR data across these different dimensions, as seen in Table 1. Of the 315 insurgent organizations recorded in our dyadic dataset, 45 see neither claim making nor recruitment linkages to ethnic groups, whereas 164 see both. In 66 dyads we see recruitment from an ethnic group, without the rebel group making exclusive claims on behalf of any ethnic group. As outlined above, it is rare that we see ethnic claim making on behalf of an ethnic group, without there being any ethnic recruitment.

4.4 Covariates

We introduce a number of additional variables. *Conflict intensity* is a dichotomous indicator of whether the conflict or dyad (according to our level of analysis) was recorded with 1000 or more battle-related deaths that year. *Conflict duration* is a variable counting the number of years the conflict has been active, which we include in addition to a variable counting the number of active conflict dyads in a country.[8] We further control for whether the non-state group of a given dyad engages in ethnic violence generally, and ethnic targeting more specifically by constructing measures for *rebel ethnic violence* and *rebel ethnic targeting* from the EOSV dataset. Finally, we include a control for GDP per capita (United Nations 2015) as an, albeit imperfect, indicator of state capacity, as well as lagged versions of our dependent variable.

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Exploring the Impact of Exclusion at the Country-level

Our data show that ethnic violence is common but does not occur in all conflicts. Among all states involved in armed conflict, we observe ethnic targeting in only 12 percent of the annual observations. This is roughly half of all state-years for which we see one-sided violence. Table 2 provides summary statistics for all the variables included in our analysis.

We begin by evaluating out first hypothesis, which posits that exclusion along ethnic lines increases the risk of ethnic violence by the state. We test this hypothesis in a logit model, using the country-year as the unit of analysis, and the results are reported in Table 3. Model 1 shows that the degree of ethnic exclusion in a country increases the risk of the state engaging in ethnic targeting against segments of its own population. In Model 2 we

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[8]All these variables are adopted from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008).

Table 2: Summary Statistics Country-level Dataset

Variable	Mean	St dev	Min	Max	N
Ethnic targeting	0.124	0.330	0	1	972
Ethnic exclusion	0.227	0.232	0	0.915	964
Ethnic conflict	0.581	0.494	0	1	972
Ethn. targ. by rebels	0.126	0.331	0	1	972
Conflict duration	13.780	12.750	0	52	972
Conflict intensity	0.191	0.394	0	1	972
Number dyads	2.086	1.622	0	11	972
Ln(GDP/cap)	6.870	1.305	4.319	10.718	970

also add ethnic conflict, which captures whether any rebel group made ethnic claims in the conflict, as an independent variable. Since exclusion and ethnic conflict are not independent from each other, and exclusion is likely to increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict in the first place, including ethnic conflict may induce post-treatment bias in our estimation of the effect of exclusion King (2010). However, the findings show that while ethnic conflict has a positive and significant effect, suggesting that states are also more likely to perpetrate violence against civilians along ethnic lines when they face rebels that make ethnic claims, our main variable of interest, ethnic exclusion, remains significant. The substantive effects are visualized in Figure 1, where we plot the predicted probability of ethnic targeting for different values of ethnic exclusion. While the predicted risk of ethnic targeting increases quite substantially with the level of ethnic exclusion, the confidence intervals are quite large. This is likely due to the fact that the number of observations also decrease with the level of exclusion. Taken together, these results provide some support for our first hypothesis and suggest that states that exclude ethnic groups from power also are more likely to perpetrate violence along ethnic lines in times of armed conflict.

In Models 3 and 4 we test our second hypothesis, assessing whether ethnic conflict is a driver of ethnic targeting also in a context of ethnic exclusion. In the theory section, we argue that ethnic exclusion is what drives state violence against civilians along ethnic

Table 3: H1 and H2: The Effect of Ethnic Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Ethnic targeting	Ethnic targeting	Ethnic targeting (High exclusion)	Ethnic targeting (High exclusion)
Ethnic exclusion	2.242**	1.859*		6.875*
	(0.709)	(0.762)		(3.061)
Ethnic conflict		1.202**	0.671	-0.025
		(0.327)	(0.531)	(0.463)
Ethn targ by rebels$_{t-1}$	0.608+	0.528	0.720+	0.516
	(0.329)	(0.327)	(0.390)	(0.570)
Conflict duration	0.003	-0.005	0.002	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.046)	(0.033)
Conflict intensity	0.420	0.273	0.765+	1.323**
	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.462)	(0.387)
Number dyads	0.141+	0.089	0.101	0.193
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.127)	(0.147)
Ln(GDP/cap)	-0.615**	-0.597**	-0.585+	-0.699
	(0.154)	(0.147)	(0.339)	(0.438)
Ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	2.609**	2.567**	1.942**	1.342*
	(0.351)	(0.362)	(0.409)	(0.603)
Constant	0.014	-0.561	0.880	-2.970
	(0.930)	(0.894)	(1.845)	(3.070)
Observations	847	847	172	167

Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$

Figure 1: Predicted Impact of Ethnic Exclusion on Ethnic Targeting (H1)

lines—and that when we see high levels of exclusion, whether insurgent groups make ethnic claims or not should not affect the probability of state-led ethnic violence. We identify all cases where exclusion is larger than 0.4, which corresponds to at least 40 percent of the population excluded from power, as a country with high levels of exclusion. We find that in these instances of high levels of exclusion, ethnic conflict does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of ethnic targeting. Hence, while ethnic conflict may strongly increase the risk of ethnic targeting in general, it does not matter in a context of ethnic exclusion. In Model 4 we also include the degree of ethnic exclusion, and find that this has a positive effect on ethnic targeting as expected even in this restricted sample of relatively high exclusion cases only. Ethnic conflict, however, does not have a significant effect in this model either. Even though we recognize the difficulty of proving a null-effect, these findings lend support to our argument that ethnic exclusion is the primary driver of ethnic targeting by state actors.

Table 4: Summary Statistics Dyad-level Dataset

Variable	Mean	St dev	Min	Max	N
Ethnic targeting	0.083	0.276	0	1	2028
Excl rebel constituency	0.541	0.498	0	1	1975
Ethnic conflict	0.466	0.499	0	1	2028
Ethn. targ. by rebels	0.072	0.259	0	1	2028
Conflict duration	10.861	11.329	0	52	2028
Conflict intensity	0.101	0.302	0	1	2028
Ln(GDP/cap)	6.719	1.303	4.319	10.718	2026

5.2 Exploring the Impact of Exclusion at the Dyad-level

The findings presented thus far evaluate and measure exclusion and ethnic violence at an aggregated level, i.e. to what extent the state excludes ethnic groups from power and whether it perpetrates violence against any ethnic groups in the country. In the third and fourth hypotheses we move to the dyadic level, evaluating separately the behavior of the state in relation to each rebel group that it faces in the armed conflict. The strength of this empirical test is that we are able to systematically test the implication of the exclusion argument by examining whether the state targets the ethnic groups from which the respective insurgent groups recruit. The summary statistics for the dyad-level dataset are presented in Table 4.

The results from the dyadic analysis are presented in Table 5. In hypothesis 3, we posited that state actors are more likely to target the civilian constituency of insurgent organizations if the latter recruit at least partially from excluded ethnic groups. This is evaluated in Model 1. Here we restrict the analysis to only those groups that recruit from ethnic groups. Hence, the point of comparison is thus insurgents that recruit from non-excluded ethnic groups. The positive and significant coefficient of excluded rebel constituency indicates that states are more likely to target civilians from the rebels' constituency when they recruit from excluded groups. These results thus suggest that the general correlation between ethnic exclusion and ethnic targeting that we identified in Table 3 indeed is a consequence of states targeting the constituencies of the insurgents when the latter recruit from the excluded population.

Table 5: H3 and H4: Dyadic level

	(1) Ethnic targeting (Given ethnic recruitment)	(2) Ethnic targeting (Given exclusion of ethnic constituency)
Excluded rebel constituency	0.793*	
	(0.362)	
Ethnic conflict		3.624**
		(0.760)
Rebel ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	-0.121	-0.433
	(0.313)	(0.386))
Dyad conflict duration	0.004	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Dyad conflict intensity	1.119**	0.996**
	(0.359)	(0.365)
Ln(GDP/cap)	-0.510**	-0.616**
	(0.142)	(0.154)
Ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	3.029**	2.928**
	(0.264)	(0.307)
Constant	-0.848	-2.387*
	(0.843)	(1.144)
Observations	1,334	896

Logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses
** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

In Model 2 we evaluate the fourth hypothesis, which proposes that in a context of insurgent organizations recruiting at least partially from excluded ethnic groups, ethnic conflict does not increase the probability that state actors will target the civilian constituency of these organizations. In other words, when the rebels recruit from groups that are excluded by the state, we do not expect state violence against civilians along ethnic lines to be driven by the claimed ethnic nature of the conflict. The findings do not support this hypothesis. In the subsample of groups that recruit from excluded groups, we do find a positive and negative effect of ethnic conflict, indicating that it does matter in this context.

For ease of interpretation, the models we have shown have estimated the effect of ethnic conflict on a subset of the observations where ethnic exclusion is high. We have also estimated models with an interaction term to better reflect the effect of ethnic conflict over the whole range of values of ethnic exclusion. The full results of those analyses are presented in the Appendix, where we also repeat our analyses based on a cross-sectional setup. Figure 2 depicts the marginal effect of ethnic conflict for various levels of ethnic exclusion based on this alternative setup. Here we see that ethnic conflict increases the risk for ethnic targeting by the state for all levels of exclusion. While this marginal effect decreases, it never reaches zero (or statistical non-significance). The figure illustrates also, however, that the number of observations with high levels of political exclusion are quite small, explaining why we found no statistically significant effect for ethnic conflict under high levels of exclusion.

For our dyadic analysis we proceed similarly by estimating the impact of ethnic conflict using an interaction term, this time interacting ethnic conflict with an indicator for whether the insurgents recruit from excluded ethnic groups. In Figure 3 we show the substantive effect of ethnic conflict on ethnic targeting. We depict average predictive differences following the suggestion by Gelman and Hill (2007). As is quite clear, exclusion does slightly reduce the effect of ethnic conflict, but the differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, given the wide confidence intervals, we cannot draw any solid conclusions about the non-effect of

ethnic targeting by government

Figure 2: Effect of Exclusion on Probability of Ethnic Targeting by the Government (H2)

ethnic conflict. However, it is worth noting that ethnic conflict is not interacted with levels of exclusion in the dyadic analysis, but with an indicator identifying any excluded insurgent constituency.[9] To further probe the implications of ethnic conflict and ethnic exclusion, we need to consider more refined operationalization approaches, in addition to alternative empirical strategies that reflect and test the theoretical predictions in a more convincing way.

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[9]This, as we discuss in the appendix, also generates an estimation problem of quasi-complete separation, requiring the use of a Bayesian logit model.

ethnic targeting by government

Figure 3: H4: Effect of Ethnic Conflict on the Probability of Ethnic Targeting by the Government

6 Conclusion

We have introduced a new dataset on the ethnic identity of victims of one-sided violence and episodes of ethnic targeting around the globe. These data allow us to investigate the relationship between ethnicity, conflict, and violence at a more fine-grained level than previously possible. A more nuanced approach in the analysis of identity-based violence is also necessary on a conceptual level. Indeed, the common conflation and overaggregation of the concepts of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence is problematic. Ethnic violence often occurs outside of ethnic conflict, and ethnic conflicts do not necessarily imply a high level of violence

against civilians along ethnic lines.

We have argued that ethnic exclusion, rather than ethnic conflict, is the main driver of ethnic state violence, and that ethnic claim making on behalf of insurgent groups — the defining feature of ethnic conflict — does not increase the risk of state-led ethnic targeting once we take ethnic exclusion into account. While the presented results are still very provisional and the dataset not yet complete, our tentative findings lend mixed support to these claims. We find that ethnic exclusion and recruitment from excluded ethnic groups are indeed relevant determinants of state-led ethnic targeting, yet cannot rule out that ethnic claim-making makes a difference as well, and even once we take levels of inequality and patterns of recruitment into account. Future versions will more thoroughly disentangle the causal relationships between ethnic claim-making, ethnic exclusion, and ethnic targeting, and rethink the research design. One main issue to address in this regard is whether our results, which were obtained under the caveat "given a conflict," are robust. More specifically, it is very likely that our main independent variables (and some unobservables) influence also the likelihood of seeing a conflict. Consequently, in future work we will try to assess how our tentative results are affected when employing techniques to address issues of possible selection bias.

Our argument also raises interesting theoretical questions that we aim to further explore in future work. For example, while we have argued that ethnic claim making is often an ideological choice, such choices are socially, historically and strategically constrained (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014a). The roots and implications of exclusionary ideologies as endorsed by both state actors and rebel groups clearly deserve further investigation. Moreover, we aim to look more closely at the implications of particular forms of ethnic exclusion and the mechanisms that link this form of inequality to the state-led victimization of civilians along ethnic lines.

Appendix

In this appendix we present additional analyses of the substantive effects. More specifically, we estimate interaction effects between our main independent variables. In table 6 we report the results of an analysis of hypothesis 2 that relies on an interaction effect. The results suggest that the share of the excluded population reduces the effect of ethnic conflict, but this reduction is only complete if (theoretically) all the population were excluded.

	Model 1
Ethnic exclusion	3.327*
	(1.176)
Ethnic conflict	1.701*
	(0.548)
Ethnic exclusion × ethnic conflict	−1.763
	(1.292)
Ethn targ by rebels$_{t-1}$	0.184
	(0.345)
Conflict duration	−0.011
	(0.011)
Conflict intensity	0.461
	(0.297)
Number dyads	0.095
	(0.073)
Ln(GDP/cap)	−0.610*
	(0.141)
Ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	2.321*
	(0.284)
Constant	−0.660
	(1.007)
N	846
AIC	426.326
BIC	615.947
$\log L$	−173.163

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 6: H2: Logit model with interaction effect

Table 7 depicts the results of our test of hypothesis H4 based on an interaction effect. As there is a problem of quasi-complete separation, the logit model generates convergence problems. Thus, we estimate the model with a Bayesian logit approach (Gelman and Hill 2007). At the outset we seem to find again support for our hypothesis four, as the effect of ethnic conflict when a rebel group recruits from at least one excluded ethnic group is not statistically significant. However, recruitment from excluded ethnic groups also fails to have an effect on ethnic targeting for rebel groups not making ethnic claims.

	Model 1
Excluded rebel constituency	0.639
	(1.051)
Ethnic claim-making	3.743*
	(0.951)
Excluded rebel constituency $\times$ ethnic claim-making	−0.226
	(1.073)
Rebel ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	−0.668
	(0.411)
Dyad conflict duration	−0.018
	(0.011)
Dyad conflict intensity	0.984*
	(0.307)
Ln(GDP/cap)	−0.599*
	(0.123)
Ethnic targeting$_{t-1}$	2.749*
	(0.270)
Constant	−2.470*
	(1.185)
N	1333
AIC	490.897
BIC	677.923
$\log L$	−209.448

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 7: H4: Bayesian logit model with interaction effect

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