

2. Executive Summary

Introduction and project aims

States gathering together and negotiating about common interest topics is an increasingly common feature of international relations. Negotiations have been studied from several points of view, including the game-theoretical, the psychological and behavioural sciences and the international relations literature. Despite this broad interest, very little systematic research exists on what makes participating countries achieve their negotiating goals in such negotiation situations, and on how they choose the bargaining positions and strategies that they will follow throughout this process. While there are case studies that illustrate many negotiation processes in detail, this type of design does not allow for generalizations to other negotiation settings. Some systematic research has also been carried out on negotiations within the Council of the European Union. Still, very little is known about larger multilateral settings under the UN framework.

The project “Negotiating Climate Change” had the aim of investigating the relevant actors and their negotiation strategies and success in the context of the international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with focus on, (i), the determinants of successful negotiation, and (ii), the determinants of the choice of any particular negotiation strategy and negotiation position by these negotiators.

The climate change negotiations constitute a particularly interesting setting both for academics and practitioners, because they are currently at a key stage determining the future regime after the Kyoto Protocol. They also lend themselves to a reconsideration of the role of developing countries in the negotiation process: as opposed to what we observe in other international negotiations, some economically extremely weak developing states such as the small island states are treated as serious negotiation partners due to their high stakes in the process.

Specifically, the project intended to test the following hypotheses¹:

- With respect to negotiation success:
 - o The more external power resources a state has, the better it can realize its negotiation goals
 - o The more internal power resources a state has, the better it can realize its negotiation goals
 - o The effect of external and internal power resources can be reinforced if the topic being negotiated is highly salient for the negotiating state
 - o The better negotiators match their bargaining strategies to their power resources, the better they can realize their negotiation goals
- With respect to choice of bargaining strategies:
 - o The more external power resources a state has, the more likely it will use hard bargaining strategies

¹ For the theoretical background behind these hypotheses, please refer to the project proposal or the individual articles.

- The less external power resources a state has, the more likely it will use soft bargaining strategies
- With respect to choice of bargaining positions and strategies we look at a two-level setting:
 - The salience of the negotiation for domestic economic and social actors and the weight these actors would obtain in a political support function determine which group is considered most relevant for the government's choice of a negotiation position and strategy
 - The partisan preferences of a government increase or decrease the effect of the economic and social actors depending on the question whether the government benefits from these groups or not
 - The definition of conflict – as conflict of interest or conflict of values – influences the choice of bargaining strategy.

Data and methods

These, and additional hypotheses that have arisen in the course of the project, have been addressed in a series of 7 research articles, four of them using statistical methods, and three relying on case studies.

This mixed methods strategy combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches is unique for negotiation research and allows us to find both generalizable results and more in-depth insights into individual countries' negotiation strategies. To ensure that the results are coherent and that the case studies inform aspects identified in the statistical analysis, the project members provided feedback to each other's research in a series of coordinated iterative steps.

An important component of the project was also the data collection process, which we detail in the following paragraphs.

Data collection

Data was collected from three main sources. Structured interviews covering negotiation positions, negotiation strategies, stakeholder influence and composition of delegations were conducted with 60 delegates from 56 different countries, plus a delegate from the EU and an expert and close adviser of the Least Developed Countries. This sample covers delegates from countries in all 5 continents and world geographical regions and all UNFCCC coalition groups, so that it is considered to be representative of all possible positions in the negotiations. The interviews were mostly conducted face-to-face, and took place during the UNFCCC negotiation meetings in Bangkok (September 2009), Barcelona (November 2009), Copenhagen (December 2009) and Bonn (April 2010, June 2010, August 2010). Some interviews were conducted by phone during the same period of time. After the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Cancun (December 2010), all the previous interviewees were asked to rate five country delegations in terms of their perceived bargaining skills and bargaining success, and we additionally asked three negotiation experts to rate success and skills of 50 delegations each.

The Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB), published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), provides summaries of the negotiation meetings of several international environmental agreements since 1992. We hand-coded all ENBs reporting the

climate change negotiation from the COP 13 in Bali (December 2007) to the COP 15 in Copenhagen (December 2009), comprising 11 negotiation rounds and a total of 90 negotiation days. For every statement reported in the bulletin, we recorded who made the statement, in which segment of the negotiations it was made, what its main topic is, and whether it was made by a country party alone, as a joint statement with other parties, or later supported or opposed by one or more other parties. In addition to a general overview regarding salience (which topic was debated, how often) and cooperation (joint statement/support), this dataset provides an overview of how these quantities evolved over the two-year period.

Submissions – written statements explaining the views and positions of negotiation parties on a specific topic – are used in the UNFCCC negotiations as the basis for compiling negotiation documents. We hand-coded all submissions sent in the two-year period from the COP 13 in Bali (2007) to the COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009) to the two negotiation groups operating during this time, covering more than 1,600 pages of proposed legal text. The coding of the submissions was used to complement the information gathered from the interviews, by obtaining information on positions by a larger sample of countries (or groups of countries) for the same issue-areas that were covered in the interviews.

These three sources of data were combined into an overall dataset of country positions, strategies and delegation characteristics, which was complemented with data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and other databases to obtain variables that control for specific country characteristics.

In addition, for the set of qualitative studies, more in-depth information about country positions and strategies and composition of delegations were collected from written submissions to the UNFCCC (in occasions over a longer period of time than those analysed for the statistical analysis), lists of participants to the negotiation meetings, newspaper reports and previous research.

Methods of analysis

As mentioned above, in the project we have used a mixed-methods design, which allows us to find both generalizable and in-depth results. Both large-N statistical analyses (multilevel analysis and propensity score matching) and case studies of specific countries and country coalitions – India, Russia and the Small Island States – are used to analyse our interest questions about bargaining strategies and success. The case studies were used to support the results found in the statistical analysis, to explore ideas that cannot be analysed in such large-N design, and to look into some of the findings of the large-N studies that were difficult to interpret. India, Russia and the Small Island States were chosen for these case studies due to India's pivotal role as an emerging economy with both high emission levels but still widespread poverty and vulnerability to climate change; to Russia's past and current ambiguous role in between international and national considerations; and to the high salience of the climate change topic for the Small Island States, which has made them achieve considerable successes in past negotiations. We expect that these case studies can reflect a variety of strategies and levels of success that will shed more light into the findings of the statistical analysis.

The specific approach used in each of the articles will be described below.

Schedule

The timeline of the project and its main outputs can be viewed in Table 1.

Table 1: Project timeline and main outputs

| Time | Activity | Output |
|-------------------------------|---|--|
| September 2009 | Draft questionnaire and interview guide Pre-testing of questionnaires Interviews (Bangkok) | |
| November 2009 | Interviews (Barcelona) | |
| December 2009 | Interviews (Copenhagen) | |
| January 2010 | Project team meeting | Dataset: ENB coding |
| April 2010 | Interviews (Bonn) | |
| May 2010 | Research design presented by Florian Weiler at PhD colloquium | PhD Research design: "Politics of Climate Change Negotiations" |
| June 2010 | Interviews (Bonn) Discussion of negotiations and project in class with BA students (Paula Castro) | |
| August 2010 | Interviews (Bonn) Paper presentation at ECPR Graduate Conference (Dublin) | Conference paper: "Climate Change Negotiations, Negotiation Positions, and Domestic Structures" (1) |
| September 2010 | Paper presentation at APSA Annual Meeting (Washington, D.C.) | Conference paper: same as (1) |
| October 2010 | Organization and presentation of first project results at PhD Workshop on International Climate Policy (Zurich) | PhD Workshop Conference paper: same as (1) Conference paper: "Has 'Annex I' Led to a Split Between Developed and Developing Countries? Determinants of Coalitions in the UN Climate Negotiations" (BA-Thesis by Lena Hörnlein) (2) |
| December 2010 | Intermediate report sent to SNIS | Intermediate narrative and financial report |
| December 2010 – February 2011 | Questionnaires about success and skills | |
| January 2011 | Paper presentation at Dreiländertagung (Basel) | Conference paper: "Path Dependence of Negotiation Structures in International Organizations: The Impact of Annex I Membership on Discussions within the UNFCCC" (revised version of paper 2) |
| February 2011 | Project team meeting | Datasets: Interviews, coding of written submissions |
| March 2011 | Paper presentation at MPSA Annual | Conference paper: same as (2) |

| Time | Activity | Output |
|----------------|--|--|
| | Conference (Chicago) | |
| April 2011 | Paper presentation at ECPR Joint Sessions (St. Gallen) Paper presentation at EPCS Annual Conference (Rennes) | Conference paper: same as (1) Conference paper: same as (2) |
| May 2011 | Final draft of article on effects of institutional structure on the negotiations | CIS Working Paper: same as (2) |
| June 2011 | Organization of side event to present and discuss project results at climate negotiations (Bonn) Paper presentation at BBQ Workshop (Brussel) | Presentation of case studies on India and the Small Island States Discussion with negotiators, NGO representatives, experts Conference paper: same as (2) |
| August 2011 | Paper presentation at ECPR General Conference (Reykjavik) | Conference paper: "Preference Attainment, Why are some countries more successful in negotiating the Earth's climate?" (3) |
| September 2011 | Organization of academic workshop to present and discuss project results with academics (Zurich) | Conference papers: "Preference Attainment: Why are some countries more successful in negotiating the Earth's climate?" (3) "Bargaining Resources and Strategies in Climate Change Negotiations" (4) "India, an emerging power in international climate negotiations: Positions and strategies in a comparative perspective" (5) "AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations: from unity to fragmentation?" (6) "Continuity and change in Russia's position in climate negotiations" (7) |
| November 2011 | Submission of 5 articles to peer review for a journal special edition Publication of 2 CIS Working Papers | Submitted articles: (3) to (7) CIS Working Papers: same as (5) and (6) |
| December 2011 | Preparation of final report | Final Report |
| January 2012 | Paper presentation at Political Economy of International Organizations Conference (Villanova, US) | Conference paper: same as (2) |
| February 2012 | Paper presentation at Annual Meeting of the Swiss Political Science Association (Lucerne) | Conference paper: same as (6) |

Results

In this section, we present a summary of the results found in each of the research articles produced in the project, describing also how the case studies illustrate some of the findings in the statistical analyses.

“Climate Change Negotiations, Negotiation Positions, and Domestic Structures”, by Florian Weiler and Stefanie Bailer (12)

International negotiation analyses often take bargaining positions as given. The article by Florian Weiler and Stefanie Weiler investigates which domestic factors and interest groups play a key role in determining negotiation positions of states in the climate change negotiations. Whereas political economic studies underline economic interests of a state, pluralist scholars would suggest societal actors to explain the negotiation behaviour, in particular interest groups or the domestic audience. In addition, the partisan preferences of governments might be useful in the explanation of a particular negotiation position. The influence of these factors might also be dependent on institutional factors such as the degree of democratization.

The results of the multivariate data analysis in the paper show clearly that climate change is a political issue which is so salient in domestic discussions that politicians react to attitudes and environmental consciousness of the public, as well as the interests of their most important veto players.

The influence of the environment ministry and the public opinion on the environment are helpful predictors for the choice of negotiation position. Furthermore, the authors found that the division into Annex I and non-Annex I countries in the climate regime is a very powerful predictor for the choice of negotiation position. Somehow less influential seems to be the pressure of business interests and lobby groups from emitter and green industries. This shows that the negotiation position of a country in climate change negotiations is not only a mere reflection of structural interests of a government but also of domestic considerations within its administration and its governmental system.

“Bargaining Resources and Strategies in Climate Change Negotiations”, by Stefanie Bailer (4)

Governments in international negotiations dispose of two instruments – resources and activities - to increase their bargaining impact. States may try to increase their endogenous resources by staffing their diplomatic delegations, by including representatives of NGOs, research or business or by choosing experienced delegation leaders. Governments also show different levels of activity by intervening during the negotiations, by organising side events and by opting for different sorts of bargaining strategies, e.g. value-claiming versus value-creating or hard versus soft bargaining.

In this article, Stefanie Bailer performs a systematic analysis of the various reasons that lead a party to adopt a certain negotiation behaviour and use certain diplomatic resources and activities, on the basis of our interview results. Using descriptive statistics, she shows which governments dispose of which resources and demonstrates that parties try to compensate a lack of bargaining resources with their negotiation behaviour.

² The numbers in brackets refer to the numbers given to each paper in Table 1. This numbering will be used for cross-referencing between the different articles produced in the project.

In a second step, her statistical cross-country analysis reveals that hard and soft negotiation strategies are actually not as mutually exclusive as they are usually portrayed in the literature. In accordance to the existing literature, the more overall economic power countries have, the more often they use hard bargaining strategies. In contrast, richer countries (in per capita terms) rather shy away from hard strategies.

Perceived vulnerability to climate change (as captured by our interviews) does seem to motivate the concerned countries to use hard bargaining strategies. For some countries, such as Bangladesh, a breakdown of negotiations would be extremely detrimental so that they seem to risk in this case being bold in negotiations in spite of a lack of economic power.

A new finding is the relationship between the democratic level of a state and its negotiation behaviour. The more democratic countries are, the less they use hard bargaining strategies. They reduce the use of hard strategies even more when they are faced with domestic pressure, be it from NGOs or greenhouse gas emitters. Being accountable to domestic stakeholders and the public means that they rather go home with any compromise than no agreement at all.

Finally, the article also provides some evidence that the negotiation experience of the delegation leader makes his delegation more likely to use hard negotiation strategies.

“Preference Attainment: Why are some Countries more Successful in Negotiating the Earth’s Climate?”, by Florian Weiler (3)

In his article, Florian Weiler explores which variables determined bargaining success at the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations in Cancun in December 2010.

Using as a measure of success the Euclidean distance from a party’s position in the negotiations to the outcome achieved in Cancun across eight issue areas, Weiler performed a multilevel statistical analysis of cross-country, cross-issue success. The results indicate that, as expected, overall economic power is the most important determinant of bargaining success. After controlling for economic power, the analysis shows that countries with higher greenhouse gas emissions tend to yield more during the negotiations than their more environmentally friendly peers.

Two variables are used to capture the effect of salience of the climate change topic for the negotiating parties. Vulnerability to climate change is the second most important factor explaining success across all statistical models analysed: it seems that more vulnerable countries tend to be more successful in the negotiations. Revenues from fossil fuels as a percentage of GDP – a measure of how much climate policy may affect a country’s economy –, is however never found to be significant in explaining negotiation success, but this result may be due to the fact that oil exporting countries are generally underrepresented in our data.

Against our expectations, internal power resources, measured by skills of the delegation and delegation size, do not seem to be a significant predictor of negotiation success after controlling for economic power. In addition, none of the statistical models showed a significant effect of bargaining strategies on negotiation success. It thus seems that external power resources, rather than internal resources or strategies of the negotiating delegation, are important for achieving success.

“Continuity and Change in Russia's Climate Negotiations Position and Strategy”, by Liliana Andonova and Assia Alexieva (7)

In their qualitative case study, Liliana Andonova and Assia Alexieva find that Russia's current position in the international climate negotiations reflects a promising shift toward recognizing the human-induced nature of the problem, outspoken support for global cooperation efforts, and willingness to make win-win economic and technological adjustments to mitigate its contribution to GHG emissions. This is a hopeful departure from the relatively obstructionist positions the country took only ten years ago. The authors of the case study argue the key to understanding this recent shift towards a more constructive role are the changes in Russian domestic elite and bureaucratic politics.

The traditional volatility and conditionality of the Russian position also persists, however. Climate change continues to be an issue of limited public salience and the Russian government remains concerned primarily with advancing unconstrained economic growth. The paper shows that the potential positive role of Russia in future cooperation is highly contingent on the broader course of negotiations and in particular on the positions of the US, China, and the Umbrella Group. Russia is also unlikely to be pushed to accept an emission ceiling stricter than the upper level of its current pledge for reasons of prestige and concerns about what Russia views as unfair competitive advantage of other emerging economies. By contrast, if large carbon emitters start to engage in club-like technological cooperation or soft emission reduction clubs, Russia is likely to be a willing player.

From a theoretical perspective, the article confirms the relevance of domestic politics in shaping countries' negotiations positions and strategies postulated in our hypotheses, and lends support to negotiations theories that emphasize the two-level interplay between international and domestic politics in shaping countries' positions, and the relevance of endogenous resources and contingent strategizing for advancing preferred outcomes.

The combination of adopting a positive rhetoric and commitment, mixed negotiation strategy and leaving ample space for manoeuvre have contributed to a relatively high degree of negotiation success for Russia in the period since the COP in Bali 2007 examined by our project. The success measure used by Weiler (article 3 above) shows that Russia attained outcomes close to its preferred positions on a variety of dimensions related for example to emission reduction targets, the use of market instruments or allocation of mitigation finance.

“India, an emerging power in international climate negotiations: Positions and strategies in a comparative perspective”, by Katharina and Axel Michaelowa (5)

Using a comparative view of the evolution of the Indian international climate policy negotiation strategy in the context of other international negotiations, Katharina and Axel Michaelowa find that Indian negotiation strategies in international climate policy have considerably changed over time. They identify a shift from defensive, pure distributive strategies to mixed strategies with a number of value creating elements, dynamism and flexibility, which appears to have been relatively successful. Despite persistent poverty and still very low levels of per capita greenhouse gas emissions, India has become a pivotal player in the international negotiations, which was acknowledged by international media and by the Secretary General of the UNFCCC during the Copenhagen and Cancun climate summits of 2009 and 2010.

The change appears to be driven by developments in the national political economy, notably by the rising public awareness of India's own vulnerability to climate change, increasing domestic energy constraints, direct economic benefits of the Kyoto Protocol's market mechanisms. Moreover, rising international pressure for India to participate in the

global effort, in particular when it comes from developing countries, seems to play a relevant role. Finally, between 2009 and 2011 the awareness rising process was further fuelled by a sharp rise in media coverage, and by the dynamics of an individual key politician, Minister Jairam Ramesh, who assumed the leading role both within the Indian delegation to the UNFCCC, and within the fractionalised domestic administration.

Some of these factors clearly reflect the domestic determinants of strategy choice also suggested in the cross-country study by Stefanie Bailer (4), and the case study on Russia by Liliana Andonova and Assia Alexieva (7). They are also in line with theoretical arguments according to which a country that has much to lose from no agreement, would tend to negotiate for a compromise (Bailer) (4).

Another important result that is more difficult to capture in a cross-country study is the important role of individual dynamic leaders such as Jairam Ramesh. His personal dynamics and close link to the media were crucial to launching the national debate on climate change. His standing and experience in national politics allowed him to obtain the freedom from constraints imposed by the Indian parliament and to become a flexible negotiator at the international level. Here, evidence for India differs from the average country case where the delegation leader's experience and qualification tends to increase the use of hard strategies (Bailer) (4). But this same example supports another proposition by Bailer (4) related to the strong importance of domestic actors for international negotiation, when the country is a democracy.

Results of the Indian case study are also in line with some of the major arguments advanced by Weiler (3) on the determinants of negotiation success. Along with India's recent growth spurt, its exogenous power resources increased making it a more relevant international player across different international negotiations. With respect to endogenous power resources, the Indian case study confirms the important role of the delegation head, and the qualification and experience of the delegation as a whole. The Indian case study further offers some evidence for Weiler's proposition (3) of the importance of a careful adjustment between the selection of hard and soft strategies, and the availability of exogenous and endogenous power resources.

"AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations: from unity to fragmentation?", by Carola Betzold, Paula Castro and Florian Weiler (6)

Small island states were able to obtain some remarkable achievements in the early stages climate change negotiations by building a cohesive coalition, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The article by Carola Betzold, Paula Castro and Florian Weiler posits that this cohesiveness – a key strength of the Alliance – has come under stress by a growing fragmentation of the UNFCCC regime. The authors contend that the multiplication of issues on the climate agenda and the increasing number of negotiation groups make it more difficult for AOSIS to speak with one voice.

Based on a qualitative analysis of written submissions to the UNFCCC, on comparison with literature on the early phase of the negotiations, and on data from our interviews, the ENB coding and the lists of participants to the UNFCCC negotiations, the authors compare the activities and positions of AOSIS as a group, and of individual AOSIS members, over three distinct periods in the climate change regime.

Success depends on the wise use of strategies in line with one's resources, as Weiler (3) demonstrates. In this article, acting as a coalition is considered as the main strategy of the small island states in the climate negotiations, even if this behaviour does not neatly fit into the distinction of hard vs. soft strategies outlined in Bailer's article (4). For island states that

lack both endogenous and exogenous power resources, joining forces in a negotiation coalition is an important mechanism to make their voice heard. For this mechanism to work, however, the coalition needs to speak with one voice. In the early period of the climate regime, this worked well. The Alliance's remarkable achievements can be explained by its unity. Despite their diversity and differences, these 43 states found common ground in their unique vulnerability to climate change.

The article finds that this unity seems in danger. As the climate agenda grows, the differences in positions and interests among AOSIS members become more pronounced, and it is more difficult to find uniting elements. The growing number of individual submissions to the UNFCCC and interventions in the debate relative to the number of group submissions highlights this trend, as well as the changes in the composition of country delegations to the UNFCCC meetings. While AOSIS members continue to advance joint positions on items such as vulnerability, financial support, or capacity building, other issue areas are more divisive. Where national interests are concerned, individual countries go as far as openly oppose joint AOSIS position, as was the case for Singapore in Bangkok, or Papua New Guinea in Copenhagen. On reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, it has apparently even been impossible to find a common AOSIS position.

The data thus indeed suggest that the diversification of issues on the climate agenda has made coordination within the small islands coalition more difficult. Since group cohesion is related to group effectiveness, this does not bode well for AOSIS. Our data do not allow us to make robust claims on how AOSIS's negotiation success has changed over time. However, there seems to be a fragmentation of success as well. As Weiler (3) shows, the success scores vary considerably among small island states, which may reflect a diversion of interests.

“Path Dependence of Negotiation Structures in International Organizations: The Impact of Annex I Membership on Discussions within the UNFCCC”, by Paula Castro, Lena Hörnlein and Katharina Michaelowa (2)

This article looks at the effect of institutional design on negotiation behaviour in the UNFCCC context. The authors start from the observation that intergovernmental organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated rules and commitments. In the case of the UNFCCC, they observe the increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries – this is, between industrialized countries with emission reduction and reporting commitments and developing countries without them –, and posit that such structures may, in turn, generate new negotiation dynamics. Drawing on socialization, psychological and incentive-based arguments, they develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups, intergovernmental organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries in the first place. This generates a particular type of path dependence rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.

While not planned in the original research design for this project, this article explores some of the negotiation dynamics that were observed by members of the project team during the data collection process, and has the aim of making both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the institutionalist literature in international relations.

Using the dataset of country oral statements during the negotiation rounds between December 2007 and December 2009 coded from the ENBs, the authors assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance towards other countries' arguments. The challenge of their econometric estimation is to disentangle the effect of group construction from the effect of various background characteristics that may drive countries' preferences

and, simultaneously, the affiliation to Annex I. As a response, they do not only carry out multivariate tobit regression analysis, but also apply propensity score matching, which allows them to avoid functional form assumptions and to restrict the sample to effectively comparable observations.

The authors find that, over and above the ex-ante differences in preferences, the split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has indeed influenced negotiation behaviour and thereby amplified the existing divide between developing and industrialized countries. More generally, this supports their constructed peer-group hypothesis, and thereby the idea of path dependence for negotiation structures and dynamics. It also implies that the creation of new country groups within an international negotiation process has institutional consequences that require some in-depth reflection: Short-term agreements found via differential treatment of specific country groups may come at a cost during later negotiation rounds.

Correspondence of results with original expectations

This section reviews the hypotheses stated above, and comments on whether the results of the research carried out over the project period confirm or contradict these hypotheses. Particularly surprising results will be highlighted. In this section we focus on the hypotheses proposed in the original proposal. However, it is important to note that over the course of the project a host of different hypotheses were tested and included in the papers, many of which show interesting and significant results.

Hypotheses on success as dependent variable:

The first hypothesis, that more (externally) powerful states are more successful in the climate change negotiations, could be confirmed. Higher power, measured by a country's total GDP, is associated with a higher likelihood to see the own position reflected in a negotiated agreement. This result is highly significant and very stable across a number of models tested in Weiler's paper (3).

On the other hand, Weiler's statistical analysis (3) did not find internal power – bargaining resources of a country's delegation – to be crucial for a country's success in the negotiations, which is against our second hypothesis. However, Michaelowa and Michaelowa find in their case study on India (5) that the qualifications and experience of the delegation and its leader played an important role for its change in negotiation strategy and in standing in the negotiations. The Indian case study reveals that the empirical results presented by Weiler in his cross-sectional analysis may, in fact, underestimate the role of endogenous power resources by imperfectly measuring the qualification of the delegation.

To test the hypothesis regarding salience, Weiler (3) distinguished between issue-specific and actor-specific salience. In the first case, higher salience was assigned to topics in which countries appear more active in the negotiations. No evidence could be found that such issue-specific salience is relevant for achieving success in the negotiations. Although this is in line with past findings from EU negotiations, it is surprising as one would expect countries with higher salience values on some issues to put more effort into the negotiations on that topic. One possible explanation for this result might be that the various issues are so interconnected that it is very difficult to discern salience among them. In such a setting, countries might be more concerned with overall success in the negotiations and pay less attention to single issues.

On the other hand, actor-specific salience operationalized as a country's vulnerability to climate change shows very strong and significant effects on negotiation success. This is in line with our expectation that being vulnerable to climate change provides countries with

moral resources that may help them to achieve their negotiation goals. This finding is also supported by the case study on the small island states (6), which describes how these states, despite lacking external and internal resources, have achieved remarkable successes in the early stages of the climate negotiations.

The hypothesis on the effect of bargaining strategies on success is again not supported by the statistical models. Neither hard nor soft strategies show significant results in the models, nor do they when interacted with external power. This is surprising but might be explained by the fact that some rich countries (expected to use hard bargaining strategies) use relatively soft approaches while small and poor states (e.g. Tuvalu or Bolivia) opt for hard negotiation behaviour. This behaviour is linked to the particularities of climate change negotiations, giving each country veto power while punishing all when the negotiations fail. Hence, as there is no clear structure as to why countries choose to play soft or hard, in a cross-sectional model no significant effect of bargaining strategies can be found.

Hypotheses on bargaining strategies as dependent variable:

Our statistical analysis confirmed the hypothesis that countries with more external power resources are more likely to use hard bargaining strategies. Economically powerful countries can afford to use hard bargaining strategies more often than their less powerful peers. The economic structure of a country, on the other hand, does not appear to influence the choice of bargaining strategies, as the insignificant effects of coal and oil exports show.

In addition to testing the hypotheses described above, we found new evidence – not foreseen at the beginning of the project – that perceived vulnerability to climate change, democratic level of a state, and the experience of the delegation leader make parties more likely to use hard negotiation strategies.

Hypotheses on negotiation positions as dependent variable:

In Weiler and Bailer's article about negotiation positions (1), the influence of industrial actors appears to be surprisingly low, contradicting the hypothesis that interest groups with high significance for a country are able to translate that influence into negotiation positions. For example, emitter interests are outright insignificant, while the variable capturing green industry has a minute (significant) effect but pointing to the unexpected direction (which would indicate that countries with a bigger established green industry prefer lower mitigation targets globally). There are two possible explanations for this rather unexpected result. First, lobbying efforts of the different industries might not impact a country's positioning behaviour dramatically. This might be the case because climate change has not yet reached the level of attention the topic deserves both by governments as well as the industries in many countries. The second possible explanation might be Arrow's theory that competing lobby groups react to each other, i.e. when one lobby group steps up its effort to influence the government, the other side will follow suit. As none of the groups can win the government over, no significant effect can be detected in the statistical models.

Our case studies, however, shed a more detailed light about the role of national actors for defining negotiation positions. Both in the Indian and the Russian case we could find that domestic recognition of vulnerability to climate change and of possible gains from cooperation in areas like energy efficiency, energy security and technological improvements. While the evidence does not directly point to specific interest groups as agents of such changes, this result is probably due to a combination of changes in the polity and bureaucracy, media attention and also lobbying.

We further investigated the impact of the partisan orientation of a government in climate change negotiations, hypothesising that partisan orientation should influence a country's positioning behaviour. In the case of climate change we find no statistically significant effect of partisan orientation, although the sign of our coefficients indicates that more left-wing governments tend to opt for more ambitious climate change policies, which is what we would naturally expect.

Finally, we find evidence that values do play a role for the determination of negotiations positions. Countries with high post-materialist values tend to favour far bigger emission reductions globally than their less post-materialistic peers. Hence, societies' values have an impact on the positions their politicians choose in international climate change negotiations, an indication that the conflict of values hypothesis is true. On the other hand, as already stated, interest groups do not influence negotiation positions dramatically, which signals that the conflict of interest hypothesis is false.

Practical application of results and policy recommendations

In terms of practical application, we expected that this project could shed more light on what works for achieving success in international negotiations even in the absence of external power resources, as is the case particularly for the small vulnerable developing countries in the case of the climate change negotiations.

One important finding for practitioners is that vulnerability does seem to matter. Having a real stake in the process appears to be important for vulnerable countries to be taken seriously by their peers in the negotiations. This result may offer some insight into why the climate change negotiations are only progressing slowly. The negotiation process seems to give smaller countries a chance to succeed, driven by the fact that vulnerability matters, but does not appear to foster consensus. This, in turn, seems to prevent the biggest and most powerful nations to accept binding and meaningful mitigation targets. Overcoming this seeming antagonism of giving smaller and poorer countries a voice and codetermination without obviating the consensus of the powerful will be the major challenge of the upcoming negotiation rounds.

The large-N statistical analysis could not confirm that either internal power resources of the delegations or the bargaining strategies chosen by them were helpful for achieving such success. On the one hand, our measures of internal power resources and bargaining strategies were still quite rough, on the other, the statistical analysis relies on averages across several issue areas and many countries that reduce the explanatory power of the results. Furthermore, it could well be that different strategies work differently for different parties, and that we could not capture such dependencies well enough.

Still, the case studies do provide more information in this respect. For small and powerless countries, acting with one voice and in a highly coordinated way, as the AOSIS coalition did in its beginnings, works for achieving concrete results in the negotiations. Our study, however, cautions against the risk that fragmentation both in the regime itself but also in the interests within the coalition may be affecting its strength. For larger developing countries such as India, which is both vulnerable and responsible for climate change, a more flexible and constructive position can help to become recognised as an important player with whom to engage when crucial decisions need to be taken. The Indian case study furthermore highlights the importance of a good negotiation leader and of ensuring the continuity and experience of the negotiation delegation. Other countries could learn from India's practice to keep the same people in its delegation, even after they change their position within the administration.

Finally, the project has opened new ground with its finding that institutions matter for parties' behaviour in an international negotiation. Concretely, we have found that having divided countries into two concretely defined groups (Annex I and non-Annex I) with different responsibilities for tackling climate change has had an effect on how countries behave in the negotiations. The mere existence of the split between Annex I and non-Annex I seems to have amplified the existing divide between developing and industrialized countries. More generally, this implies that the creation of new country groups within an international negotiation process has institutional consequences that require some in-depth reflection. Short-term agreements found via differential treatment of specific country groups may come at a cost during later negotiation rounds, and this needs to be taken into account when designing new international agreements.

Questions for further exploration

The results of the project have shed light into several aspects that could be analysed in further research on international negotiations. They are mostly related to the limitations of quantitative analyses and to data collection requirements.

Our approach suffers from the shortcoming that negotiation behaviour is measured at only one point in time³. Negotiations are a dynamic process passing through various stages, particularly when spanning many years as in the case of the climate change talks. As the literature suggests, considering negotiation strategies at several stages in the negotiations would allow for controlling whether a government changes its strategy by starting tough and yielding later. This approach is considered to be quite successful in contrast to a soft strategy throughout the process. Quite possibly we have interviewed the delegations too early in order to account for such strategy changes. Some interview partners confirmed this when they pointed out the tactic "exchanging concessions for mutual benefit" would only be used later. This also highlights that bargaining tactics are also chosen as reaction to the behaviour of others. Follow-up studies should take up this question and question how often and under what circumstances strategies changed and were mixed. Recent research suggests that mixed strategies seem to reap the biggest benefits in international negotiations.

In the same line of thought, due to our inability to capture the whole dynamics of the negotiation process and especially because we were unable to measure a final outcome of the negotiations (which we thought would happen in Copenhagen in December 2010, but unexpectedly did not), it is conceivable that important explanatory factors of success during other negotiation phases misleadingly show insignificant results in our models.

While our case studies were better suited to capture such long-term dynamics, and the related changes in strategies and negotiation success, they cannot capture the full picture either. As we only analyzed the positions of one country (or country coalition) at a time, we could not observe what was the influence exerted by other countries that may have similar interests and positions. A broader analysis that looks beyond individual countries or coalitions to their interaction with other countries' interests and the results of such interaction would be highly desirable to obtain a fuller picture of what conditions led to success in the negotiations.

Furthermore, linkages with other international negotiations (or across different issue-areas within the climate change negotiations) and side payments are not captured in the models we have analyzed. As success in the negotiations is likely linked also to these

³ While we have some data that span over a 2-year period, the information on bargaining strategies was obtained through interviews that were held only once for each delegation.

processes, further research could include them in more complex quantitative models or in qualitative research.

Our research also has provided mixed evidence on the role of salience of the negotiations for the choice of bargaining strategies. Contradictory results were found when using two different indicators to measure climate vulnerability (our indicator for country-specific salience). Thus, more careful analysis of the role of salience – testing different indicators and functional forms, or through further case studies – could provide more clarity on this issue.

Finally, our research has revealed that institutional structures (“constructed peer-groups”) may have an important effect on parties’ negotiation behaviour. We have proposed three possible explanations for such effect: group psychology (closer relationships through exchange within groups), negotiation structure (initial group discussions leading to more distanced positions debated at the global level), and new incentives (fighting for the preservation of new group-related privileges). In this project, we were not able to distinguish between these three effects and test them, but we believe that such distinction may be relevant for appropriate policy recommendations. Thus, it may be worthwhile to follow this question in further research. To reach more general conclusions, such research could also compare the case of the UNFCCC elaborated here, to more detailed case studies of other international organizations such as the WTO.

Past and expected publications and other activities

As detailed in the project’s schedule presented in Table 1, seven research papers have resulted from this project. Five of them have already been submitted to a highly ranked climate-change specific journal as proposal for a special edition, and are currently in the peer-review process. The other two articles will be submitted to political science journals in the coming months. Some of these articles are already available as working papers and can be downloaded from the website of the Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich (<http://www.cis.ethz.ch/publications/publications>).

Furthermore, the results of the research have been discussed in the academic and practitioners communities at several occasions. In addition to presentations at a number of academic conferences, we have organized three events to facilitate the discussion with academics, NGOs, negotiators and the wider public:

- A workshop with PhD students working on topics related to international climate policy, which took place in October 2010 and was co-financed by the SNIS and the CIS (see also CIS Newsletter 20 attached, page 19).
- A side event presentation at a climate change negotiation meeting in Bonn on 7 June 2011, financed by the CIS, and co-organized by the project team and the UK-based Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN). Under the heading “Building Capacity of developing country leaders and negotiators to influence international talks”, Katharina Michaelowa and Paula Castro from the project team presented first results of the case studies on India and the Small Island States in the negotiations and CDKN introduced a new initiative to improve negotiation capacity of least developed countries’ representatives. This was followed by a panel discussion led by project team member Christoph Bals from Germanwatch; participants included Cuban delegate Orlando Rey, Zambian delegate Ephraim Mwepya Shitima, climate negotiations expert Farhana Yamin (the Children’s Investment Fund) as well as Benito Müller (University of Oxford and European Capacity Building Initiative). The very lively debate highlighted in particular the role of trust in building capacity and moving

the negotiations forward, and provided us with valuable comments on our ongoing work. Moreover, with the topic, CIS and CDKN proved to touch a fundamental concern in the UNFCCC process. Not only did the comments from the audience indicate interest in the topic; the high attendance rate also spoke for itself. In spite of the side event closing a long day of negotiations, the room was packed and many attendants stayed on to ask more questions and discuss the issues raised by the panel (See also CIS Newsletter 21, page 19, for further details on the side event) .

- An academic workshop aimed at discussing our preliminary research results with the academic community, and particularly with scholars specialising on negotiation research and on the climate change negotiations, which was held on 28 September 2011 at the ETH. With 45 participants from universities in 10 countries, but also from government, international organizations, NGOs and the private sector, the workshop was very successful and we managed to engage in lively discussions on the results and implications of our research. We received especially useful comments from our invited discussants: Joyeeta Gupta, Professor of Climate Change Law and Policy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, John Odell, Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California and a renowned specialist in the field of negotiation research, and Joëlle de Sépibus from the World Trade Institute in Bern. Joyeeta Gupta has also provided a paper (along the lines of her presentation at the workshop) which will enhance the interdisciplinary perspective of the publication by adding a legal and institutional analysis.

Finally, the project has not only produced academic publications and presentations, but also contributed to the completion of a BA thesis and a PhD thesis. Lena Hörnlein, who acted as a research assistant to the project, helping in the data collection process, wrote her BA thesis with the title “Has ‘Annex I’ Lead to a Split Between Developed and Developing Countries? Determinants of Coalitions in the UN Climate Negotiations”, achieving the best grade in her studies of Philosophy and Economics at the University of Bayreuth. Florian Weiler, who started his PhD at the ETH Zurich in the framework of this project at the end of 2009, is planning to defend his thesis on the “Politics of Climate Change Negotiations” at the end of 2012.