What International Negotiators Promise and Domestic Policymakers Adopt: Policy and Politics in the Multi-Level Climate Change Regime

To which degree and under which conditions do countries translate their international commitments regarding CC mitigation into their domestic policies (i.e. policy objectives and instruments)?

Project Summary

The goal of the Paris Agreement to keep global warming well below 2°C can only be reached if countries commit to and adopt ambitious climate change mitigation action. However, we often witness a gap between both aspects. While many countries are not able to keep up with their promises, others even outperform their international commitments regarding climate change mitigation.

The following questions are addressed:

  • To which degree and under which conditions do countries translate their international commitments regarding CC mitigation into their domestic policies (i.e. policy objectives and instruments)?
  • What drives countries to under- or outperform?

This project aims to quantify and qualify the gap between international promises and national implementation. To this end, we advance an interdisciplinary theory that involves political actors from the international, national, and subnational level and the harmonization of policies between those levels. To measure this harmonization of climate change mitigation (the dependent variable), we create a vertical policy harmonization index, which reflects the divergence between international commitments and national implementation. Explaining the gap, we probe relevant macro-economic and political factors. Further, the project examines normative questions linked to vertical policy harmonization, like democratic legitimacy at both levels of decision-making, the relative success of autocracies in international bargaining agreements, and the type of bargaining strategies most beneficial to protecting the global climate.

We combine several research methods including policy network analysis, expert interviews, econometric analysis, and forecasting political negotiation outcomes. We use both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. In addition, a computer scientist will develop, maintain, and store large-scale datasets.

Our results will provide normative guidance on the set-up of institutions and specific advice for actors striving to reduce the gap between international commitments and domestic policy adoption. The results also provide a basis for a more realistic prediction of the level of the ambition gap. We partner with several NGOs to involve external and practical expertise in almost all research tasks and to disseminate the results to UNFCCC delegates, national governments, and other decision-makers.

Academic Output

Executive Summary

Many countries’ current national climate change mitigation (hereafter: mitigation) policies fall short of the pledges outlined in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), limiting the likelihood of reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement. This project combines insights from various (sub)disciplines and engages with multiple research methods to investigate to what extent and under what conditions countries deviate from their international pledges at the national level.

To this end, we developed two novel indices that measure countries’ level of vertical policy harmonization along three key dimensions of mitigation policymaking (see Task 1). The Target Index compares the level and scope of the greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets (hereafter: targets) of 82 countries’ NDCs and national policies – i.e., we measure whether these targets are harmonized or to what extent they deviate. The Policy Effort Index incorporates countries’ climate policy mix to assess the credibility of 36 countries’ targets. We find that despite a quarter of the countries covered having national targets that are either in line with or more ambitious than their NDC target, most countries (accounting for 70% of global emissions) fall short of their targets given countries’ relatively insufficient policy mixes. Additionally, we show that different macro-level factors (e.g., democracy and fossil fuel dependency) are associated with greater deviations between countries’ NDCs and national policies.

In Task 2, we collaborated with computer scientists to create two datasets related to participation in international climate negotiations. In the first dataset, we count how often each country makes a statement in the negotiations, and how often and in what manner it interacts with other countries or country groups. In the second dataset, we systematize information on countries’ negotiation delegations, including their size, composition, experience, and affiliation of their members. We use this data to assess the extent to which countries with a stronger engagement in the UN climate negotiations, in the broader ecosystem of international climate-related organizations, and in transnational climate governance initiatives have more ambitious NDCs and stronger domestic mitigation policies; we find substantive differences between developing and developed countries. Additionally, we examine the presence and participation of small states in the UN climate negotiations to discuss the ways by which small states can compensate for their limited personnel capacities in order to meaningfully engage in the negotiations.

In Task 3, we turn our focus to the national decision-making processes with the aim to examine which factors in a climate policy subsystem drive the harmonization of NDCs and national policies. At the domestic level, actors’ preferences and power resources can influence the political feasibility of policies, and thus countries’ ability to keep their promises. Following this, we expect certain attributes of a policy subsystem (e.g., the level of actor involvement, the presence of “two-level connectors”) to precondition the likelihood of policy adoption, in turn driving harmonization. In addressing these expectations, we draw on the Policy Effort Index. So far, we have run six policy elite surveys to collect data on the relevant factors of a policy subsystem. Ourpreliminary results indicate that the existence of “two-level connectors” are relevant in explaining the gap between countries’ NDCs and national mitigation policies.

In Task 4, we used the Predictioneer’s Game to forecast the ability or willingness of the German and Swiss governments to close the gap between their NDCs and national policies. To this end, we focused on relevant, country-specific factors that may facilitate the harmonization of NDCs and national policies.

The project makes important contributions to the study of countries’ policy responses to climate change. The Vertical Policy Harmonization Indices and subsequent analysis shed further light on countries’ ability to keep commitments and provide the basis for future research on the multilevel governance of climate change and other policy problems.

Report

Countries’ ability under the Paris Agreement to limit warming to 2˚C, if not to 1.5˚C, has been in question since the adoption of the treaty in 2015. This has prompted calls for countries to increase the ambition of their mitigation pledges in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to close the emissions gap between countries’ NDCs and global temperature goals. In addition to this emissions gap, there is an implementation gap as countries’ current national policies fall short of the mitigation pledges outlined in their NDCs (Lee et al. 2023).

Working Paper

Under the Paris Agreement, addressing global warming entails international mitigation pledges and national policymaking. But do countries adopt climate policies in accordance with their pledges? This paper introduces the Vertical Policy Harmonization Indices, which quantify the gap between a country’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) and its national mitigation policies. These indices incorporate three dimensions of climate policymaking: emission reduction targets, the sectors covered by those targets, and the policy instruments introduced to reduce emissions. The Target Index compares the level and scope of reduction targets in the NDCs and national policies of 82 countries, covering approximately 90% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The Policy Effort Index incorporates the policy mix of 36 countries, covering over 70% of global GHG emissions. These indices provide avenues to investigate why countries’ domestic actions deviate from their international pledges and to evaluate the effectiveness of the progression mechanism as countries update their NDCs.

Working Paper

In order to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, countries must make increasingly ambitious commitments to mitigate climate change. While this is often called for on the international level, countries must also harmonize their national policies with their increasingly ambitious international commitments. Yet, the ability of countries to do so varies. In this article, we discuss the normative implications of encouraging a norm of harmonization, i.e., whether vertical policy harmonization should be encouraged or whether disharmony should be accepted as a technical feature of the global climate change regime. We do not find a clear-cut answer as vertical policy harmonization provides (non-)consequentialist benefits (e.g., increased emission reductions, facilitate trust) and disadvantages (e.g., incentivizes unambitious commitment-setting). Following this, we conclude that we ought to be less dismissive than seems fitting at first sight as to simply insist that commitments must be kept is too short-sighted.

Working Paper

While the Paris Agreement is still the core of global climate governance, the system has become increasingly polycentric – with growing numbers of climate governance initiatives emerging at subnational, transnational, and international levels. It is expected that these various governance systems may work to reinforce each other and help to drive more ambitious climate policy. From a state-centered point of view, however, meeting the Paris Agreement’s global temperature goal requires countries to both propose ambitious mitigation targets under their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and to adopt the necessary laws, policies, and measures at the domestic level to meet those targets. Using existing measures of NDC ambition and a newly developed index of climate policy harmonization, we apply regression analysis to investigate the drivers of countries’ NDC ambition and NDC alignment with domestic policies and measures. We focus particularly on the extent to which countries with a stronger engagement in the international UN-led climate negotiations, in the broader ecosystem of international climate-related organizations, and in transnational climate governance initiatives have more ambitious NDCs and stronger domestic mitigation policies. The results suggest that developing countries with stronger involvement in the UN-led and other international climate governance processes tend to have more ambitious NDCs and stronger mitigation policies, but the same cannot be found for industrialized countries. We explain these synergistic effects of polycentric engagement in developing countries with a discussion of polycentric systems’ contribution to increasing knowledge, understanding and trust, and to the emergence of new shared norms and beliefs.

Working Paper

Amongst the many challenges, hampering the ability of the global regime to address climate change is the translation of international commitments to domestic policies. To facilitate the adoption of the Paris Agreement on the international stage and its successful implementation in the domestic arena, countries must harmonize their interests at various levels of governance. However, this complex task often results in a gap between what international negotiators promise and what domestic policymakers adopt. This paper presents the first large-N application of the novel Vertical Policy Harmonization Index (VPHI) that measures the difference between policy output at the international level, i.e., countries’ commitments to climate change mitigation as communicated in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and their domestic strategies, plans, or policies. To do so, this paper draws on well-studied hypotheses from the climate governance literature using regression analysis to study a representative sample of countries. The key research aim is to disentangle the effect of various macro-level characteristics on a country’s degree of vertical policy harmonization. I expect that some macro-level factors (e.g., high vulnerability and low abatement costs) facilitate vertical policy harmonization, whereas others have a debilitating effect (e.g. high degree of decentralization in government).

Working Paper

In many multilateral environmental negotiations, Parties are formally equal. In practice, however, states are highly unequal in their capacity to participate in – and influence – multilateral negotiations. A frequently used indicator of negotiation capacity is delegation size. Delegation size clearly matters, with larger delegations better able to cope with highly complex, often very technical and lengthy negotiations such as those on climate change. Delegation size, however, varies enormously, with some countries only represented by two or three delegates. Countries with smaller delegations have, however, found ways to compensate for their limited capacities. Existing research has highlighted the role of coalition- building and cooperating with like-minded countries.

Yet, we argue that there are additional strategies to compensate for limited negotiation capacity beyond coalition-building that have not yet been studied systematically. We focus on three such compensation strategies: First, states can enlist the support of NGOs, think tanks or other experts to boost their numbers and access relevant scientific, legal or diplomatic expertise. Second, they can send more experienced delegates. Senior negotiators who attend negotiation sessions regularly are more familiar with the subject and process and are therefore better able to actively engage and make their voice heard. Third, and related to experience, states can also pay attention to delegation coherence by sending the same team over time. Coherence allows members of the delegation to specialize in different thematic sessions and follow them in parallel.

We test these three compensation mechanisms by examining delegation size and delegation composition in the negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We make use of new data generated from the list of participants to all Conferences of the Parties (COPs) as well as the interim negotiations of its subsidiary bodies from 1995 to 2019. We examine under what conditions smaller and poorer countries resort to non-state delegates to boost their numbers, send more experienced negotiators, and/or maintain delegation coherence as strategies to compensate for small delegations.

Research Team

Marlene Kammerer
Coordinator
University of Bern

Karin Ingold
Co-Coordinator
University of Bern

Paula Castro
Principal Member
University of Zurich

Victor Kristof
Principal Member
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL)

Katharina Michaelowa
Principal Member
University of Zurich

Axel Michaelowa

Principal Member
University of Zurich

Dominic Roser
Principal Member
University of Fribourg

Detlef Sprinz
Principal Member
University of Potsdam

 

 

Langston Jame “Kimo” Goree IV
Associated Member
International Institute for Sustainable Development

Martin Grosjean
Associated Member
University of Bern

Patrick Hofstetter
Associated Member
World Wildlife Fund Switzerland (WWF)

Jesse Keenan
Associated Member
Tulane University

Luca Lo Re
Associated Member
International Energy Agency France (IEA)

Melissa Low
Associated Member
National University of Singapore

Mary Luomi
Associated Member
International Institute for Sustainable Development

Sara Moarif
Associated Member
International Energy Agency France (IEA)

Benito Müller
Associated Member
Oxford University